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ABSTRACT 
This  r e p o r t  d i s cus se s  t h e  o v e r a l l  e f f e c t s  o f  and reasons  f o r  concern about ,  
t h e  cu r r en t  and expected budget d e f i c i t s  with r e s p e c t  t o  macroeconomic s t a b i l i -  
z a t i o n  e f f o r t s .  It has  been v a r i o u s l y  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  c u r r e n t  budget d e f i c i t s  
have caused,  worsened, o r  prolonged t h e  r ecen t  c o n t r a c t i o n  i n  economic a c t i v i t y ;  
t h a t  t he  prospect  o f  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  has  had t h e s e  same e f f e c t s ;  o r  t h a t  d e f i c i t s  
t h a t  w i l l  occur l a t e r  during the  recovery a r e  l i k e l y  t o  a b o r t  o r  i n h i b i t  economic 
expansion. 
An examination o f  t he se  a s s e r t i o n s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  theore-  
t i c a l  o r  empi r i ca l  support  f o r  t h e  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  e i t h e r  t h e  c u r r e n t  o r  expected 
f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  a r e  con t r ac t i ona ry  i n  t h e  convent ional  sense  of  t h e  t e r m ,  mean- 
i n g  a  reduc t ion  i n  aggrega te  demand f o r  goods and s e r v i c e s  i n  t h e  economy. In- 
s t e a d ,  t he  a n a l y s i s  sugges ts  t h a t  t he  poss ib le  adverse  macroeconomic consequences 
o f  t h e  pro jec ted  d e f i c i t s  a r e  p r imar i l y  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e i r  p o t e n t i a l  t o  a f f e c t  
the  a b i l i t y  of  the economy t o  produce ou tpu t .  This  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  no t  t r i v i a l ,  
and can have important  imp l i ca t i ons  f o r  t h e  type  o f  p o l i c i e s  adopted t o  e l i m i n a t e  
o r  reduce f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s .  
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INTRODUCTION 
V i r t u a l l y  a l l  p ro j ec t i ons  of  Federa l  budget r e c e i p t s  and o u t l a y s  over  t h e  
next  f i v e  yea r s  i n d i c a t e  unprecedentedly l a r g e  budget d e f i c i t s .  These d e f i c i t s  
a r e  l a r g e  both i n  a b s o l u t e  s i z e  and a s  a percentage o f  GNP. They fo l low no t  
only from c u r r e n t  t r e n d s  i n  o u t l a y s  and c u r r e n t  r e c e i p t s  bu t  a l s o  from budget 
p ro j ec t i ons  i nco rpo ra t i ng  s u b s t a n t i a l  spending l i m i t a t i o n s .  Moreover, they  a r e  
no t  e n t i r e l y  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  t he  depressed s t a t e  o f  t h e  economy; t hey  would a l s o  
be r e l a t i v e l y  h igh  i f  t he  economy were ope ra t i ng  a t  c apac i ty .  
These high d e f i c i t s ,  both c u r r e n t  and a n t i c i p a t e d ,  have caused cons iderab le  
concern. It has been f r equen t ly  a s s e r t e d  w i th in  t h e  popular p ress  and bus iness  
community t h a t  d e f i c i t  spending by t h e  government has  had c o n t r a c t i o n a r y  r a t h e r  
than expansionary e f f e c t s  on employment and ou tpu t .  It has  a l s o  been a s s e r t e d  
t h a t  c u r r e n t  f e a r s  about l a r g e  d e f i c i t s  expected t o  occur  have delayed o r  re -  
t a rded  the  cu r r en t  recovery from t h e  r eces s ion .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  e f f e c t s  of  
f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  have been va r ious ly  s t a t e d  a s  i n f l a t i o n a r y ,  capable  o r  a r r e s t -  
ing  t he  recovery,  and l i k e l y  t o  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  reduce investment and long-term 
growth. 
Conventional economic theory sugges ts  t h a t  not a l l  t he se  propos t ions  can 
be t r u e .  For example, i t  seems c o n t r a d i c t o r y  t o  argue t h a t  c u r r e n t  d e f i c i t s  
a r e  con t r ac t i ona ry  now but t h a t  a s  l a r g e  o r  l a r g e r  d e f i c i t s  occur r ing  i n  t h e  
f u t u r e  w i l l  be i n f l a t i o n a r y .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i f  one ho lds  t h a t  l a r g e  d e f i c i t s  i n  
t he  f u t u r e  can abo r t  the  recovery then one would assume t h a t ,  wi th  recovery 
a b o r t e d ,  t h e  economy would n o t  g e t  c l o s e  enough t o  f u l l  employment f o r  f u t u r e  
d e f i c i t s  t o  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  reduce investment  and growth o f  c a p a c i t y .  Presumably, 
some o f  t h e s e  concerns  abou t  d e f i c i t s  a r e  n o t  j u s t i f i e d  i f  o t h e r s  a r e .  
S o r t i n g  through t h e s e  v a r i o u s  c l a i m s  i s  made p a r t i c u l a r l y  d i f f i c u l t  by 
a confus ion  engendered by t h e  use  o f  c e r t a i n  terms.  T r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  t h e  p r in -  
c i p a l  focus  o f  macroeconomics has  been on t h e  demand f o r  goods and s e r v i c e s  
i n  t h e  economy. Most o f  t h e  words a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  b u s i n e s s  cycles--words 
l i k e  expans ionary ,  c o n t r a c t i o n a r y ,  r e c e s s i o n ,  r ecovery ,  and others--have been 
p r i m a r i l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  a g g r e g a t e  demand. The c u r r e n t  d i s c u s s i o n  
of t h e  r o l e  o f  d e f i c i t s  i n  t h e  r e c e s s i o n  and recovery has  s u f f e r e d  from the 
f a c t  t h a t  some o f  t h e s e  terms have been c a r r i e d  over  i n t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of 
t h e  d e f i c i t s '  supply-s ide  e f f e c t s .  As a  consequence,  some p r o p o s i t i o n s  con- 
c e r n i n g  t h e  d e p r e s s i n g  e f f e c t s  o f  d e f i c i t s ,  whi le  i n a p p l i c a b l e  i n  terms o f  
demand, may be c o r r e c t  i f  t h e y  r e f e r  t o  supply.  
Th is  paper a t t e m p t s  t o  c l a r i f y  t h e  i s s u e .  The e f f e c t  o f  l a r g e  and con- 
t i n u i n g  d e f i c i t s  on both  supp ly  and demand i s  ana lyszed .  These e f f e c t s  a r e  
examined i n  terms o f  (1) t h e  e f f e c t  o f  c u r r e n t  d e f i c i t s  on c u r r e n t  econo- 
mic a c t i v i t y ,  ( 2 )  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  on t h e  
c u r r e n t  s t a t e  o f  t h e  economy, and ( 3 )  t h e  consequences o f  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  on 
economic a c t i v i t y  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  These hypothesized e f f e c t s  a r e  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  
from each o t h e r  and ana lyzed  t o  de te rmine  which a r e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  what we know 
o r  can reasonab ly  t h e o r i z e  about  t h e  economy. The i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e s e  e f f e c t s  
f o r  tax p o l i c y  a r e  t h e n  d i s c u s s e d .  
I, THE RECENT DEFICITS AND THE 1981-82 ECONOMIC CONTRACTION 
Since at least the middle of this century, the overwhelming majority of 
economists has embraced economic theory that maintains that increases in the 
government's deficit are expansionary. The Keynesian model of the macroeconomy 
is probably best known for this proposition. What is less known is that the 
quantity theory model used by many monetarists also indicates an expansionary 
role, albeit a smaller one, for deficits in the Federal budget. - 1/ While a 
small minority of economists has maintained that there is no long-run effect on 
the level of income from fiscal policy, - 2 /  the proposition that increases in 
the deficits are actually contractionary is rarely found in the professional 
economics literature. For example, none of the major textbooks used by univer- 
sities in this country entertain the idea that higher deficits reduce aggregate 
demand. - 3/ In addition, virtually none of the empirical investigations of the 
subject have contradicted the standard theory in this regard. The consensus of 
the economics profession is that increases in the deficit are, by themselves, 
1/ See, for example, Friedman, Milton. Comments on the 
of ~oiitical Economy, vol. 80, Sept./Oct., 1972, pp. 906-950; 
Monetarism in Historical Perspective. In Mayer, Thomas, ed. 
Critics. Journal 
Cagan , Phillip. 
The Structure of 
Monetarism pp. 85-93, 1983, Norton, New York; and Stein, Jerome. Monetarist, 
Keynesian, and New Classical Economics, New York University Press, New York, 
1982. 
2/ For example, Anderson, L. and Carlson, K .  A Monetarist Model for 
~conomic Stabilization. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, April 1970, 
pp. 7-25. 
3/ Consult, for example, the country's two best selling undergraduate 
interzediate macroeconomic textbooks : Gordon, R.J. Macroeconomics. Little Brown, 
Boston, 1982; and Dornbush, R. and Fischer, S. Macroeconomics. McGraw-Hill, 
1982. 
i f  a n y t h i n g ,  expansionary.  I n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  d e f i c i t  may have d e l e t e r i o u s  e f -  
f e c t s  on some i n d i v i a u a l  i n d u s t r i e s .  Under some c i rcumstances ,  t h e y  may con- 
c e i v a b l y  prompt t h e  F e d e r a l  Reserve t o  adop t  a more r e s t r i c t i v e  monetary p o l i c y .  
But s t a n d a r d  t h e o r y  h o l d s  t h a t  by themselves  and i n  a g g r e g a t e  terms t h e  e f f e c t  
o f  i n c r e a s e d  budget d e f i c i t s  i s  n o t  c o n t r a c t i o n a r y .  
A .  How D e f i c i t s  A f f e c t  Aggregate Demand 
The expansionary c h a r a c t e r  o f  i n c r e a s e d  d e f i c i t  spending can be f a i r l y  
e a s i l y  e x p l a i n e d .  - 4 /  A t a x  c u t ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  
d e f i c i t ,  a l s o  i n c r e a s e s  d i s p o s a b l e  income r e l a t i v e  t o  what i t  would have been 
o t h e r w i s e .  The i n c r e a s e  i n  d i s p o s a b l e  income w i l l  e i t h e r  be saved o r  s p e n t .  
To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  i t  i s  saved ,  i t  prov ides  r e s o u r c e s  f o r  t h e  Government t o  
borrow wi thou t  reduc ing  r e s o u r c e s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  a g g r e g a t e  inves tment .  The por- 
t i o n  o f  i n c r e a s e d  d i s p o s a b l e  income t h a t  i s  s p e n t  provides  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  con- 
sumption t h a t  i s  a n  e x a c t  o f f s e t  t o  t h e  investment  t h a t  i s  crowded o u t  by i n -  
c reased  Government borrowing. Barr ing any o t h e r  e f f e c t ,  t h e  r e s u l t  i s  a n  even 
wash. The sum o f  e x t r a  comsumption demand and s a v i n g  e q u a l s  t h e  amount borrowed 
on c r e d i t  marke t s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  government e x p e n d i t u r e s  w i l l  a l s o  
provide a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t o t a l  demand t h a t  fully o f f s e t s  t h e  f a l l  i n  investment  
due t o  h i g h e r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  However, t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t h a t  
accompanies e x t r a  Government borrowing r a i s e s  t h e  c o s t  o f  ho ld ing  money. The 
p b l i c  t y p i c a l l y  responds by t r y i n g  t o  ho ld  less money, s h i f t i n g  t h e i r  p o r t f o l i o  
ho ld ings  toward bonds and o t h e r  e a r n i n g  a s s e t s  and ,  t h u s ,  moderating t h e  impact 
o f  a d d i t i o n a l  Government borrowing on i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and inves tment .  I n  o t h e r  
4 /  This  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s ,  i n  v e r b a l  t e rms ,  i d e n t i c a l  wi th  t h e  mathemat ical  
a p p a r a t u s  known a s  IS-LM a n a l y s i s  i n  macroeconomics where t h e  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  
e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  t h e  economy are examined i n  t e rms  o f  a n  investment  and s a v i n g  
r e l a t i o n  a l o n g  w i t h  a l i q u i d i t y  demand and money supp ly  r e l a t i o n .  
words, t h e  h igher  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  coax t h e  publ ic  i n t o  f inanc ing  more govern- 
ment and bus iness  borrowing; hence, investment need not  f a l l  n e a r l y  s o  much a s  
would o therwise  be necessary  t o  accommodate t h e  e x t r a  Government borrowing. The 
r e s u l t  of t h i s  i s  an i nc rease  i n  t o t a l  aggrega te  demand--the sum o f  investment 
demand, consumption demand, and Government demand f o r  goods and s e r v i c e s .  - 5 /  
A s  long a s  a d d i t i o n a l  capac i ty  e x i s t s ,  r e a l  income w i l l  tend t o  r i s e .  - 6/ The 
i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  d e f i c i t  should ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  o t h e r  economic e f f e c t s  a s i d e ,  cause 
an expansion of  ou tput  and employment, no t  a  c o n t r a c t i o n .  The i n t e r e s t  r a t e  
i n c r e a s e s  t h a t  accompany t h i s  expansion normally do no t  choke o f f  demand; 
r a t h e r ,  they a r e  a consequence o f  t h e  demand i n c r e a s e  t h a t  r e s u l t s  from t h e  
increased  d e f i c i t .  
This i s  t r u e  even when one cons iders  t he  behavior of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e .  
The h igher  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  c r e a t e d  by a d d i t i o n a l  Government borrowing tend t o  
draw c a p i t a l  i n t o  the  country from abroad. As  t h i s  occu r s ,  t h e  va lue  o f  t h e  
d o l l a r  r i s e s ,  depressing U.S. expor t s  and inc reas ing  U.S. impor t s .  Under a  
system of f l e x i b l e  r a t e s ,  the  supply o f  fo re ign  currency must equa l  i t s  demand. 
Thus, t h e r e  occurs  an  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  supply o f  fo re ign  cur rency  on exchange 
markets a s  i n v e s t o r s  abroad t r y  t o  acqu i r e  d o l l a r s  t o  i n v e s t  i n  h igh  y i e l d i n g  
U.S. a s s e t s .  The amount of  d o l l a r s  l e f t  over  t o  purchase U.S. produced goods 
f a l l s .  Export 
i ng  employment 
demand and U .S . demand f o r  import-competing goods f a l l ,  depress -  
i n  t he se  s e c t o r s  a s  a  r e s u l t .  
5/ This  d i s cus s ion  neg lec t s  t he  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  " m u l t i p l i e r " ,  a  process  by 
which-all t h e  above e f f e c t s  on aggrega te  demand a r e  magnified a s  a d d i t i o n a l  i n -  
come c r e a t e s  a d d i t i o n a l  consumption and s o  on. When t h i s  i s  taken i n t o  accoun t ,  
t he  ne t  expansionary e f f e c t  i s  even g r e a t e r .  
6 /  I f  e x t r a  capac i ty  does no t  e x i s t  t h e  r e s u l t  i s  h igher  p r i c e s .  I n  e i t h e r  
ca se  nominal income tends  t o  expand a s  a  consequence o f  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  d e f i c i t .  
However, t he re  i s  aga in  an o f f s e t t i n g  e f f e c t  t h a t  should keep t h e  Govern- 
ment borrowing from being con t r ac t i ona ry .  The e a s i e s t  way t o  understand t h i s  i s  
t o  r e a l i z e  t h a t  the  reduc t ion  i n  expor t  bus iness  i s  a  concomitant o f  inf lowing 
c a p i t a l .  This  e x t r a  c a p i t a l  i s  a n  o f f s e t  t o  crowding o u t ,  making i t  poss ib l e  
f o r  the  Government t o  borrow more without decreasing investment.  That i s ,  t he  
depress ing  e f f e c t  o f  c a p i t a l  inf lows on expor t s  a l s o  moderates t h e  e f f e c t  of 
borrowing on i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and investment.  The ne t  impact of  a  t a x  c u t  o r  
expendi ture  i nc rease  i s  s t i l l  p o s i t i v e ,  even tak ing  i n t o  account t h e s e  i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  flows. 7 /  - 
It i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t o  no te  t h a t  t he se  explana t ions  have been presented i n  
terms o f  d e f i c i t s  c r ea t ed  by t a x  c u t s  o r  increased  government expendi ture .  
Changes i n  the  d e f i c i t  a l s o  come about a s  a  r e s u l t  of  changes i n  t he  l e v e l  o f  
ou tput .  These a r e  o f  an e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  cha rac t e r .  These changes i n  the  
d e f i c i t  cannot be s a i d  t o  have expansionary o r  con t r ac t i ona ry  e f f e c t s  because 
they themselves a r e  t he  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  economy's expansion o r  con t r ac t i on .  Thus, 
throughout t h i s  r e p o r t ,  t he  d i s cus s ion  of  t he  e f f e c t s  of  d e f i c t s  r e f e r s  t o  those 
changes i n  t h e  budget t h a t  have r e s u l t e d  from d i s c r e t i o n a r y  changes i n  t axes  and 
expendi tures  and not those c y c l i c a l  changes r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  r i s e  o r  f a l l  i n  
economic a c t i v i t y .  Consequently t h e  measure o f  t he  d e f i c i t  app rop r i a t e  t o  t h e  
d i sucs s ion  of i s s u e s  i n  t h i s  r epo r t  i s  the  d e f i c i t  s tandardized f o r  some l e v e l  
o f  unemployment--usually def ined  a s  f u l l  employment. 
7 /  An example of  t he  t r a d i t i o n a l  model t h a t  inc ludes  these  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
t rade-effects  can be found i n  Wykoff , F .C. Macroeconomics, Theory, Evidence, 
and Polc iy .  1976, P ren t i ce  H a l l ,  Englewood C l i f f s ,  New Je rsey .  Chapter 22.  
B.  A Theore t i ca l  Exception: E f f e c t s  on Money Demand 
Edmund Phelps c i t e s  one s i t u a t i o n  i n  which an  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  d e f i c i t  
might not  be expansionary. - 8/ He sugges t s  t h a t  a  t a x  c u t  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  t h e  
p u b l i c ' s  demand f o r  money ( i . e . ,  t h e i r  w i l l i ngnes s  t o  hold t h e i r  a s s e t s  i n  t h e  
form o f  money i n s t e a d  o f  something y i e l d i n g  i n t e r e s t ) .  T h i s ,  he  a r g u e s ,  could 
occur because t h e  p u b l i c ' s  d i sposab le  income w i l l  be h i g h e r ,  expendi tures  w i l l  
r i s e ,  and t h e  need f o r  money t o  execute  t he se  a d d i t i o n a l  t r a n s a c t i o n s  w i l l  i n -  
c r e a s e .  A s  i n  t h e  i nc rease  i n  t h e  demand f o r  any good, a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  demand 
f o r  money fo rces  i t s  p r i c e  up. I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  p r i c e  i s  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e ,  
so t h a t  t he  pub l i c ' s  increased  demand f o r  money c r e a t e s  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  f o r c e  
pushing t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  up  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  a  t a x  c u t .  This  i s  a n  e f f e c t  
beyond t h a t  normally a s soc i a t ed  with crowding o u t ,  b a s i c a l l y  equ iva l en t  i n  
i t s  r e s u l t  t o  con t r ac t i ona ry  monetary po l icy .  I f  money demand depends on 
taxes  i n  t h i s  way, i t  would be t h e o r e c t i c a l l y  pos s ib l e  f o r  a  tax c u t  t o  produce 
a  con t r ac t i ona ry  e f f e c t  (a l though whether t h e  e f f e c t  i s  a c t u a l l y  c o n t r a c t i o n a r y  
depends on the  r e l a t i v e  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  investment and money demand t o  i n t e r e s t  
and income). 
There a r e  t h r ee  reasons f o r  regard ing  t h i s  t h e o r e t i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  a s  un- 
l i k e l y  t o  occur i n  t he  a c t u a l  economy. F i r s t ,  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  e m p i r i c a l  work 
with money demand has r e l a t e d  i t  t o  income ( o r  permanent income). 9/ Phe lps '  - 
argument imp l i e s  t h a t  household money demand depends on household expendi tures .  
8/  Phe lps ,  Edmund. Cracks i n  t h e  Demand Side;  A Year o f  Crisis i n  Theore- 
tical-~acroeconomics . American Economic Review. May 1982, pp. 378-381. 
9/ For a comprehensive s tudy  o f  money demand, s e e  Goldfeld,  S. t h e  Demand 
f o r  ~ G n e ~  Revised. Brookings Papers on Economic A c t i v i t y ,  3  1973, pp. 577-638. 
An update of  money demand r e sea rch  i s  i n  Judd, J. and Scadding, J. The sea rch  
f o r  a  S t a b l e  Money Demand Funct ion.  Jou rna l  o f  Economic L i t e r a t u r e ,  Sep t .  1982, 
pp. 993-1023. 
Yet,  Steven Goldfeld t r i e d  modeling household money demand with consumer ex- 
pendi ture ,  and the  s p e c i f i c a t i o n ,  i f  anyth ing ,  worked l e s s  wel l  than one us ing  
income. 10/ This  p a r t i c u l a r  r e s u l t  from Goldfe ld ' s  s tudy suppor t s  t h e  usua l  -
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  money demand dependent on t o t a l  income and draws i n t o  ques t ion  
t h e  i dea  t h a t  a  t a x  c u t  could a f f e c t  money demand i n  t h e  way Phelps sugges ts .  
The work of  Vito Tanzi provides a  second reason f o r  regarding Phe lp ' s  
t h e o r e t i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  a s  empi r i ca l l y  unimportant.  11/ One o f  t h e  few -
researchers  i n  t h e  a r e a  o f  monetary economics t o  t ake  e x p l i c i t  account of  
t axes  i n  h i s  money demand equa t ions ,  he does no t  use d i sposable  income i n  
h i s  s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  In s t ead ,  Tanzi emphasized the  r o l e  of  t he  e f f e c t  of  
t axes  on the  a f t e r - t a x  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  on investment.  This  t a x  e f f e c t  i s  
the  oppos i te  of  t h a t  c i t e d  by Phelps .  Tanzi no tes  t h a t  a decrease  i n  
t axes  causes  a f t e r - t a x  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t o  r i s e .  By r a i s i n g  the  r e t u r n  on 
a l t e r n a t i v e  a s s e t s ,  t h i s  e f f e c t  decreases  t he  quan t i t y  of  money demanded 
and makes f i s c a l  po l icy  even more expansionary. Thus, Tanz i ' s  work in-  
d i c a t e s  t h a t  even i f  the  con t r ac t i ona ry  in f luence  c i t e d  by Phelps occurs ,  
t h e r e  would be another  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  t a x  c u t  working i n  t h e  oppos i te  d i r e c -  
t i o n  t h a t  would tend t o  o f f s e t  the  con t r ac t i ona ry  i n f luence .  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e r e  i s  t h e  weight o f  empi r i ca l  evidence on the  e f f e c t  of  t ax  
c u t s  and expendi ture  i nc reases  on aggregate  demand. I f  t ax  c u t s  had the  kind 
o f  e f f e c t  on money demand c i t e d  by Phelps ,  i t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  some empi r i ca l  
evidence would have emerged over t he  l a s t  twenty-five years  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  
10/ Goldfeld,  op  c i t .  - -- 
11/ Tanzi ,  Vi to .  Income Taxes and the  Demand f o r  Money: A Quan t i t a t i ve  
~ n a l y x s .  Banca Nazionale d e l  Lavoro Quar te r ly  Review, March 1979, pp. 55-72 
and Demand f o r  Money, I n t e r e s t  Ra tes ,  and Income Taxat ion.  Banca Nazionale d e l  
Lavoro Quar te r ly  Review. December 1974. pp. 319-328. 
expansionary f i s c a l  po l icy  has  perverse  e f f e c t s  on employment and ou tpu t ;  
none have. 12/ -
C. The 1981-82 Economic Contract ion 
The no t ion  t h a t  a n  i nc rease  i n  t h e  d e f i c i t  can have c o n t r a c t i o n a r y  e f f e c t s  
on aggrega te  demand i s  a  view widely r e j e c t e d  by most economists.  The proposi- 
t i o n  t h a t  t a x  c u t s  and expendi ture  i n c r e a s e s  tend t o  expand demand has  been ex- 
amined by economists and,  given what i s  known o f  economic behavior ,  t h e  theory  
i n  both simple and complex forms suppor t s  t h i s  p ropos i t i on .  Most s t a t i s t i c a l  
evidence b u t t r e s s e s  t h i s  conclusion.  - 13/ Even those  who deny i t ,  o r  who have 
con t r a ry  evidence only go s o  f a r  a s  t o  say  t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t  i s  neutral--not con- 
t r a c t i o n a r y .  Thus, t h e  r ecen t  c o n t r a c t i o n  must be a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  something 
o the r  than the  i nc reases  i n  t he  d e f i c i t .  
The consensus among economists i s  t h a t  t h e  1981 c o n t r a c t i o n  was p r i n c i p a l l y  
due t o  monetary po l i cy .  A s  a  r e so lve  developed over  t h e  l a s t  few y e a r s  t o  
make a s e r i o u s  a n t i - i n f l a t i o n  e f f o r t ,  i t  became apparent  t h a t  a  r e s t r i c t i v e  
monetary po l icy  would have t o  be implemented. The t i g h t e r  monetary po l i cy  
was requi red  because, whether o r  not one might want t o  augment i t  wi th ,  s ay ,  
f i s c a l  s t r i ngency  o r  incomes po l i cy ,  slowing t h e  growth o f  monetary aggrega tes  
12/ A t  wors t ,  some s t u d i e s  have ind i ca t ed  t h a t  f i s c a l  po l i cy  has  no 
e f f e c c  and t h e s e  s t u d i e s ,  a n a l y s i s  i n d i c a t e s ,  a r e  s e r i o u s l y  b iased  downward so  
t h a t  t h e  a c t u a l  e f f e c t  i s  probably i n  t he  d i r e c t i o n  convent iona l ly  be l i eved .  
See Modigl iani ,  F.  and Ando, A Impacts o f  F i s c a l  Act ions on Aggregate Income 
and the  Monetar is t  Controversy: Theory and Evidence. i n  Monetarism. S t e i n ,  J .  
ed.  North Holland. 1976. pp. 17-42. 
13/ This  view i s  a l s o  embodied i n  t h e  major econometric models. See f o r  
exampE,  t he  r e s u l t s  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  f i s c a l  po l i cy  e f f e c t s  i n  E lwe l l ,  Craig.  
The Macroeconomc Consequences o f  A l t e r n a t i v e  D e f i c i t  T r a j e c t o r i e s :  An 
Econometric Analysis  CRS Report No. 82-141E, J u l y  1982; and C a s h e l l ,  Brian.  
P o t e n t i a l  Macroeconomic E f f e c t s  of  Rescinding Phase 3 of t h e  Persona l  Income 
Tax Cut ,  CRS Report No. 82-213E, Dec. 1982. 
i s  a  nessary  condi t ion  f o r  slowing i n f l a t i o n .  That i s ,  i n f l a t i o n  cannot be re- 
duced without t i g h t  money no mat te r  what e l s e  might a l s o  need t o  be done. 1 4 /  - 
This  a l s o  means, however, t h a t  t h e  economic con t r ac t i on  was t r i gge red  by a n t i -  
i n f l a t i o n a r y  po l icy ,  s i nce  a  con t r ac t i on  i n  economic a c t i v i t y  i s  the  n a t u r a l  
consequence o f  t h e  monetary a c t i o n s  taken t o  slow i n f l a t i o n .  151 This  con- - 
t r a c t i o n a r y  outcome can be explained a s  fol lows.  
The growth i n  t o t a l  nominal income can be divided i n t o  two components: 
( 1 )  r e a l  output  growth and ( 2 )  t h e  rise i n  p r i ce s  ( i . e . ,  i n f l a t i o n ) .  By d e f i n i -  
t i o n ,  t he se  must equa l  t h e  sum o f  ( a )  t h e  growth o f  money and ( b )  t he  r a t e  of  
change i n  how f a s t  the  money c i r c u l a t e s  ( i . e . ,  the  change i n  i t s  "ve loc i ty" ) .  
I f  t he  economy i s  a t  i t s  p o t e n t i a l ,  and i f  v e l o c i t y  i s  changing a t  a  cons tan t  
r a t e ,  a  su s t a ined  reduc t ion  i n  t he  r a t e  o f  change i n  p r i ce s  can only  be achieved 
by reducing t h e  growth r a t e  o f  money. However, p r i ce  i nc reases  a r e  u sua l ly  s e t  
i n  advance, i n  a n t i c i p a t i o n  of  f u t u r e  economic cond i t i ons ,  and o f t e n  based on 
pas t  experience.  This  means t h a t  t h e  slow growth i n  money, a t  f i r s t ,  can only 
slow the  r a t e  o f  growth of  r e a l  output-contract ing the  economy a s  t he  amount 
o f  money f o r  t r a n s a c t i o n s  becomes i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  support  increased  economic 
a c t i v i t y  a t  t he  p r i ce s  a l r eady  s e t  so  t h a t  output  t ends  t o  slow o r  decrease .  
Af t e r  some experience with t he  lower l e v e l s  o f  ou tpu t ,  f i rms and workers u sua l ly  
a j d u s t  changes i n  p r i ce s  and wage r a t e s  t o  r e f l e c t  the  r e a l i t y  o f  lower money 
growth. A s  p r i c e s  r i s e  more s lowly,  ou tput  begins  t o  grow more qu ick ly  u n t i l  
p o t e n t i a l  i s  achieved aga in .  A temporary con t r ac t i on  o f  output  i s  thus  t raded  
f o r  a  reduc t ion  i n  t h e  r a t e  o f  p r i c e  change permanently below what i t  would 
otherwise be.  
14/  See, f o r  example, Gordon, op. c i t .  pp. 189-190. -
15/ It i s  not  n e c e s s a r i l y  c o r r e c t ,  though, t o  assume t h a t  t h e  s e v e r i t y  o r  
l e n g t h o f  t he  con t r ac t i on  was i n t e n t i o n a l .  
This explana t ion  i s  complicated,  though not  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  changed, by t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  t he  growth r a t e s  o f  monetary v e l o c i t y  change. While growing a t  a  f a i r l y  
s t eady  r a t e  over t he  long-run, t h e  v e l o c i t y  of  money i s  v o l a t i l e  over s h o r t  p e r i -  
ods and tends  t o  r i s e  more slowly dur ing  c o n t r a c t i o n s .  This  shor t - run  v o l a t i l i t y  
of v e l o c i t y  c r e a t e s  t he  dua l  problem of  r e i n f o r c i n g  t i g h t  money p o l i c i e s  and 
making i t  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  po l icy  makers t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  a  temporary, random, o r  
c y c l i c a l  change i n  v e l o c i t y  growth from a  fundamental one t h a t  r e q u i r e s  a n  ad- 
justment o f  long-term money growth t a r g e t s .  I n  t h e  most r e c e n t  downswing, t h e  
behavior of  v e l o c i t y  has been s u r p r i s i n g l y  (and t o  many, i n e x p l i c a b l y )  cont rac-  
t i o n a r y  ( i . e . ,  v e l o c i t y  growth has  been extremely s low) ,  exacerba t ing  t h e  e f f e c t s  
of monetary po l icy  on the  economy. 
Nonetheless,  a s  explained above, an economy, over  t he  longer  term, can r e -  
cover from a  c o n t r a c t i o n  without t h e  h e l p  o f  f i s c a l  o r  monetary s t imulus .  Such 
a  recovery would be a s  a  r e s u l t  of  t h e  downward r e v i s i o n  of  p r i c e s ,  though t h i s  
mechanism may t ake  a  long t i m e  t o  occur .  Consequently,  policymakers may be 
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  pursuing two a l t e r n a t i v e  means of  r e s t o r i n g  ou tpu t .  Money growth 
can be increased  through monetary po l icy ;  o r  v e l o c i t y  can be boosted by engaging 
i n  expansionary f i s c a l  policy--a process which occurs  when government borrowing 
i n c r e a s e s  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and decreases  t h e  p u b l i c ' s  d e s i r e  t o  hold money (because 
of the g r e a t e r  foregone income from not holding earn ing  a s s e t s  i n s t e a d ) .  The pro- 
blem with both o f  t he se  methods i s ,  t h a t  while  they may speed what might o the r -  
wise be a  very  slow and pa in fu l  recovery,  they do not  r e l y  on t h e  p r i c e  a d j u s t -  
ment process descr ibed  above. Hence, they do no t  permit t h e  exper ience  wi th  
unemployment and s l a c k  demand t o  have i t s  f u l l  and l a s t i n g  e f f e c t  on p r i c e s  
with the  r e s u l t  t h a t  i n f l a t i o n  a f t e r  t h e  c o n t r a c t i o n  may be h igher  than  i t  
would be without s t imulus .  
E a r l y  g a i n s  a g a i n s t  i n f l a t i o n  d u r i n g  a c o n t r a c t i o n  can make i t  e a s y  t o  be- 
l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  a n t i - i n f l a t i o n  e f f o r t  i s  s u c c e s s f u l  and t h a t  i t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  
s a f e  t o  provide economic s t i m u l u s .  High r e s o u r c e  as w e l l  as s o c i a l  c o s t s  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  unemployment may underscore  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  c o n t r a c t i o n  
cannot  be f u r t h e r  endured and t h a t  s t i m u l u s  i s  necessa ry .  I f  a n  a n t i - i n f l a -  
t i o n a r y  monetary p o l i c y  i s  r e v e r s e d ,  however, and t h e  economy s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
s t i m u l a t e d ,  many o f  t h e  g a i n s  a g a i n s t  i n f l a t i o n  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be temporary and 
t h e  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  can wind up  back c l o s e  t o  where i t  was o r  h i g h e r .  
There a r e  many who b e l i e v e  t h a t  i s  what happened d u r i n g  t h e  previous  a n t i -  
i n f l a t i o n  pushes.  - 16/ I n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  ve ry  s h o r t  r e c e s s i o n  of 1980 i s  h e l d  up  
as a n  example o f  a n t i - i n f l a t i o n  p o l i c y  implemented and q u i c k l y  abandoned ( t h e n  
implemented a g a i n  p r e c i p i t a t i n g  t h e  most r e c e n t  c o n t r a c t i o n  on ly  12 months l a t e r ) .  
These r e v e r s a l s  o f  a n t i - i n f l a t i o n  p o l i c y  a r e  b e l i e v e d  t o  a f f e c t  t h e  p u b l i c ' s  
e x p e q t a t i o n  o f  f u t u r e  i n f l a t i o n .  I f  t h e y  happen enough t h a t  t h e y  become a n t i c i -  
pated they can d e t r a c t  from t h e  c r e d i b i l i t y  o f  f u t u r e  e f f o r t s .  The p rocess  
s u g g e s t s  t o  economic a g e n t s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  need t o  a d j u s t  p r i c e s  down- 
ward i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  s l a c k  demand because " s t imulus  i s  j u s t  around t h e  corner . "  
Hence, i n  f u t u r e  c o n t r a c t i o n s ,  i t  can  t a k e  even l o n g e r  and l o n g e r  b o u t s  o f  
unemployment and b u s i n e s s  f a i l u r e  t o  convince everyone t h a t  t h e  a n t i - i n f l a t i o n  
e f f o r t  i s  f o r  r e a l  and t h a t  downward p r i c e  ad jus tment  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e .  
Th i s  view accounts  f o r  why many a n a l y s t s  expected a s low recovery  from t h e  
r e c e n t  c o n t r a c t i o n .  P r i c e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  regarded a s  hard t o  budge, p a r t l y  
because o f  previous  a n t i - i n f l a t i o n  e f f o r t s  t h a t  have been abandoned. I f  t h e  Fed 
16/ See Cagan, P h i l l i p .  Two P i t f a l l s  i n  t h e  Conduct o f  A n t i - i n f l a t i o n a r y  
 onet tar^ P o l i c y ;  a l s o  F e l l e r ,  W i l l i a m .  On t h e  Merits o f  Gradualism and on a  
Fa l l -back  P o s i t i o n  I f  It Should Never the less  F a i l :  I n d t r o d u c t o r y  Remarks; bo th  
i n  Contemporary Economic Problems. W i l l i a m  F e l l n e r ,  e d . ,  American E n t e r p r i s e  
I n s t i t u t e ,  1981, pp. 3-52. 
tr ies t o  hold on t o  t h e  g a i n s  made a g a i n s t  i n f l a t i o n  through a  r e s t r i c t i v e  mone- 
t a r y  po l icy ,  economic a c t i v i t y  should i n c r e a s e  r e l a t i v e l y  s lowly.  Consequently,  
t h e  judgement o f  those  who have pred ic ted  a  slow recovery i s  probably based 
more on cu r r en t  and past  monetary po l i cy  t han  on c u r r e n t  o r  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s .  
However, t h e r e  i s  another  pos s ib l e  e f f e c t  t h a t  needs t o  be cons idered  
before  the  p o t e n t i a l  r e t a r d i n g  in f luence  o f  l a r g e  and cont inu ing  d e f i c i t s  on 
aggrega te  demand can be r e j e c t e d .  The preceeding a n a l y s i s  h a s  d e a l t  wi th  t h e  
e f f e c t s  of  d e f i c i t s  on concurrent  economic a c t i v i t y .  It showed t h a t  i n c r e a s i n g  
a  government budget d e f i c i t  would tend t o  expand ou tpu t  du r ing  t h e  per iod i n  
which the  d e f i c i t  was c r ea t ed  (and immediately a f t e r ) .  However, a  d e f i c i t  ex- 
pected some time i n  t h e  f u t u r e  might a l s o  a f f e c t  economic a c t i v i t y  today.  There 
i s  no p a r t i c u l a r  reason ,  without  undertaking f u r t h e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  t o  assume 
t h a t  t h i s  e f f e c t  must be expansionary. 

11. FUTURE DEFICITS AND CURRENT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 
Even a  s u p e r f i c a l  l ook  a t  c u r r e n t  economic l i t e r a t u r e  impresses  a  r eade r  
with t h e  frequency with which convent iona l  p ropos i t i ons  a r e  reversed  a s  a 
r e s u l t  of a  few changes i n  t h e  assumptions o f  i n d i v i d u a l  behavior .  In  p a r t i c -  
u l a r ,  cons ide ra t i on  o f  t h e  pub l i c ' s  expec t a t i ons  o f  f u t u r e  po l i cy  can  have 
t h i s  e f f e c t .  Consequently, t h e r e  i s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  simple model o f  
t h e  economy explained i n  t h e  previous s e c t i o n  i s  no t  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  enough t o  
embody a l l  t h e  pos s ib l e  complicat ions r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  e f f e c t  o f  con t inu ing  
d e f i c i t s  on expec t a t i ons .  I t  may be t h a t  t h e  a n t i c i p a t i o n  o f  l a r g e  f u t u r e  
d e f i c i t s  causes  changes i n  c u r r e n t  economic behavior ,  c r e a t i n g  a  c o n t r a c t i o n a r y  
e f f e c t  now before  t he  expansionary e f f e c t  o f  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t  i n c r e a s e s  can o f f -  
s e t  i t .  
This  no t ion  may unde r l i e  t he  somewhat u n s p e c i f i c  c la ims  o f  many i n d i v i -  
dua l s  t h a t  t he  d e f i c i t s  t h r e a t e n  r a t h e r  than a s s i s t  recovery.  A number o f  sce- 
n a r i o s  have been cons t ruc ted  t h a t  r epo r t ed ly  y i e l d  t h i s  r e s u l t .  17/ However, -
l i t t l e  o r  no r e sea rch  has y e t  appeared i n  t h e  p ro fe s s iona l  economics l i t e r a t u r e  
i n  which these  e f f e c t s  a r e  r i go rous ly  and completely worked ou t  i n  a  t h e o r e t i -  
c a l l y  s a t i s f a c t o r y  manner, much l e s s  e m p i r i c a l l y  t e s t e d .  
It i s  nonethe less  pos s ib l e  t o  examine t h e s e  c la ims  i n  terms o f  t h e  s tand-  
a rd  macroeconomic model, t o  check them f o r  i n t e r n a l  cons i s t ency ,  cons i s t ency  
with a v a i l a b l e  evidence,  and consonance wi th  widely he ld  t h e o r i e s  contained 
17J See S i n a i ,  Allen.  Reaganomics and t h e  F inanc i a l  Markets,  Data 
~ e s o z c e s  U .S. Review, February 1983, pp. 1.37-1 - 4 5 ;  Penner ,  Rudolph. 
Macroeconomic Po l i cy ,  and Domestic Saving. I n  Saving and Government Po l i cy ,  
Federa l  Reserve Bank o f  Boston Conference S e r i e s  No. 25,  1982; and Penner ,  
Rudolph. The 1983 Budget. The AEI Economist, Match 1982 a 
i n  c u r r e n t  models o f  economic behavior.  Examined i n  t h i s  framework, t h e r e  a r e  
e s s e n t i a l l y  four  ways f o r  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  t o  in f luence  cu r r en t  economic a c t i v i t y :  
( 1 )  t he  t h r e a t  o f  h igher  d e f i c i t s  may c r e a t e  i n f l a t i o n a r y  expec t a t i ons ;  ( 2 )  i t  
may change the  d e s i r e  o f  f i rms  t o  i n v e s t  i n  p lan t  and equipment; ( 3 )  i t  can a l t e r  
t h e  w i l l i ngnes s  t o  lend resources  f o r  investment;  and ( 4 )  i t  might a l s o  i n f luence  
t he  r i s k  preceived by those  involved i n  t he  investment process .  Each o f  t h e  four  
p o t e n t i a l  i n f luences  o f  a n t i c i p a t e d  d e f i c i t s  on c u r r e n t  economic behavior  i s  
rxamined i n  t he  following s e c t i o n s .  General ly ,  some appear t o  have no v a l i d i t y ,  
while  o t h e r s  may be t h e o r e t i c a l l y  pos s ib l e  but u n l i k e l y  t o  occur .  
A. The E f f e c t  o f  Ant ic ipa ted  D e f i c i t s  on I n f l a t i o n a r y  Expectat ions 
Al len  S i n a i  appears  t o  r e l y  on t h e  high d e f i c i t - i n f l a t i o n a r y  expec t a t i ons  
mechanism f o r  h i s  argument t h a t  the  p ro j ec t i on  o f  l a r g e  d e f i c i t s  has r e t a rded  
economic a c t i v i t y .  - 18 / D e f i c i t s  themselves,  he admi ts ,  may no t  be i n f l a t i o n a r y ,  
but market p a r t i c i p a n t s  may expect the  Fed t o  i nc rease  t he  money supply i n  
response t o  them. This  i s  not  an  unreasonable assumption. High d e f i c i t s  and 
t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  d e f i c i t  f inanc ing  may u l t i m a t e l y  have on i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  pu ts  
p ressure  on t h e  Fed t o  ease  monetary po l icy  i n  o rde r  t o  l e s s e n  t h e  impact on 
i n t e r e s t  s e n s i t i v e  i n d u s t r i e s ;  some research  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  the  Fed has i n  t h e  
pas t  responded t o  t h i s  p ressure  by monetizing d e f i c i t s  ( i . e .  c r e a t i n g  money t o  
f inance  them). Since t h i s  money c r e a t i o n  can l i k e l y  gene ra t e  i n f l a t i o n ,  t h e  
prospect  o f  l a r g e  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  may indeed s i g n a l  t o  market p a r t i c i p a n t s  t h a t  
g r e a t e r  i n f l a t i o n  i s  on the  way. 
This  expec t a t i on  of  h igher  i n f l a t i o n  would be incorporated i n t o  c u r r e n t  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  Consequently, S i n a i  and o t h e r  proponents o f  t h e  view t h a t  d e f i c i t  
18/ S i n a i ,  op. c i t e  -
induced i n f l a t i o n a r y  expec t a t i ons  r e t a r d  recovery a r e  a rgu ing  t h a t  t h e s e  h igher  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  choke o f f  investment demand and o f f s e t  any s t imulus  genera ted  by 
t h e  c u r r e n t  d e f i c i t .  S i n a i  e s t ima te s  t h a t  a  $100 b i l l i o n  r educ t ion  i n  t h e  de- 
f i c i t  would r e s u l t  i n  a  300 b a s i s  point  f a l l  i n  short- term i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and 
an  i n c r e a s e  i n  ou tput  and employment over  c u r r e n t  p ro j ec t i ons .  
S i n a i ' s  a n a l y s i s ,  however, has  two s i g n i f i c a n t  shortcomings. F i r s t ,  t h e  
i n f l a t i o n a r y  expec t a t i ons  should r e s u l t  i n  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  nominal, n o t  r e a l ,  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  I f  l ende r s  and borrowers a r e  both prompted by t h e  p ro j ec t i on  
o f  d e f i c i t s  t o  expect  a  c e r t a i n  amount o f  i n f l a t i o n ,  then n e i t h e r  t h e  r e a l  y i e l d  
from lending nor t h e  r e a l  cos t  o f  borrowing changes.  Investment ,  purchases o f  
consumer du rab l e s ,  and o t h e r  i n t e r e s t  s e n s i t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  should n o t  be  a f f e c t -  
ed.  Hence, i n t e r e s t  r a t e  i nc reases  due t o  i n f l a t i o n a r y  expec t a t i ons  should no t  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  economic a c t i v i t y .  Th i s  i s  t h e  s tandard  ana ly-  
sis of investment behavior:  a n t i c i p a t e d  i n f l a t i o n  should have no e f f e c t  on t h e  
volume o f  r e a l  investment .  This  conc lus ion  does n o t  r e q u i r e  t h a t  businessmen 
c a l c u l a t e  t h e i r  r e a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  It i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t h a t  businessmen be aware 
t h a t  f u t u r e  i n f l a t i o n  a l s o  imp l i e s  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  p r i c e  a t  which t h e i r  pro- 
duc t s  w i l l  be s o l d .  19/ -
Aside from the  use o f  nominal i n s t e a d  o f  r e a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i n  S i n a i ' s  
a n a l y s i s ,  h i s  hypothes i s  ha s  an  a d d i t i o n a l  problem i n  t h a t  i t  can on ly  e x p l a i n  
t he  behavior of  long-term i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  That i s ,  a  persuas ive  ca se  might be 
made t h a t  t h e  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  w i l l  r a i s e  i n f l a t i o n  i n  a  few y e a r s ,  bu t  no t  i n  
t he  next few months. There should be l i t t l e  o f  such an  i n f l a t i o n  premium i n  
19/ The reason why S i n a i  g e t s  t he se  r e s u l t s  i s  because he i n c o r p o r a t e s  
h i s  e s t ima te s  o f  t h e  d e f i c i t s '  e f f e c t  on i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i n t o  t h e  D R I  model. 
D R I  uses  an investment equa t ion  which depends on nominal i n s t e a d  o f  r e a l  r a t e s .  
3 month t r e a s u r y  b i l l s ,  f o r  example. 20/ Yet S i n a i  p r e d i c t s  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  f a l l  i n  - 
t h e s e  r a t e s  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  reduced d e f i c i t s  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  21/ - 
B. The I n f l u e n c e  o f  Fu ture  D e f i c i t s  on Investment Demand 
Rudolph Penner p r e s e n t s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a  s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
o f  even t s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  impact o f  d e f i c i t  a n t i c i p a t i o n s  on c u r r e n t  a c t i v i t y .  22/ -
As i n t e r p r e t e d  by James Tobin,  Penner s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  expected e f f e c t s  o f  f u t u r e  
d e f i c i t s  on f u t u r e  l e v e l s  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and income might a f f e c t  t h e  c u r r e n t  
w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  consume and i n v e s t .  Tobin demons t ra tes  t h a t  t h e  p rospec t  o f  
l a r g e  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  can ,  under  c e r t a i n  c i rcumstances ,  have a  d e p r e s s i n g  
e f f e c t  on c u r r e n t  economic a c t i v i t y  ( b u t  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y ) .  23/ However, i t  can -
a l s o  be shown t h a t  i n  o r d e r  f o r  t h i s  e x p e c t a t i o n  e f f e c t  t o  lower a g g r e g a t e  de- 
mand, i t  must a l s o  lower i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  24/ I n t e r e s t  r a t e s  would be lower be- -
cause  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  e f f e c t  d e s c r i b e d  by Penner works through t h e  supp ly  and 
20/ Another phenomenon t h a t  c a s t s  doubt on t h i s  h y p o t h e s i s  i s  t h e  behavior  
o f  f o r e i g n  exchange markets .  A s  i n d i c a t e d  e a r l i e r ,  c a p i t a l  f lows i n t o  t h e  U.S. 
from abroad i n  response t o  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  between t h e  U.S. and o t h e r  
c o u n t r i e s .  I f  U.S. i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  h igh  due t o  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  h igher  U.S. 
i n f l a t i o n ,  t h e n  no d i f f e r e n c e  a c t u a l l y  e x i s t s  between t h e  r e a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  i n  
t h e  U.S.  and abroad .  Consequent ly ,  t h e  l a r g e  c a p i t a l  in-flows a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
r e c o n c i l e  wi th  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  i n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  
h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
21/ These p r e d i c t i o n s  should no t  be confused w i t h  D R I  model p r o j e c t i o n s .  
I n  s z t e  o f  S i n a i ' s  p r o j e c t i o n s ,  t h e  DRI  model s t i l l  y i e l d s  r e s u l t s  t h a t  show 
t a x  c u t s  and e x p e n d i t u r e  i n c r e a s e s  t o  be expansionary.  See E l w e l l ,  and C a s h e l l ,  
op.  c i t .  
22/ Penner ,  Macroeconomic P o l i c y  and Domestic Saving.  op.  c i t .  -
231 Tobin,  James. D i s c u s s i o n ,  Saving and Government P o l i c y .  F e d e r a l  Re- 
s e r v r ~ a n k  o f  Boston Conference S e r i e s  No. 25, 1982, pp. 126-137. 
24/ The a n a l y s i s  h e r e ,  as  i n  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  r e p o r t ,  can be expressed  mathe- 
matically; o r  g r a p h i c a l l y  i n  terms o f  what i s  c a l l e d  "IS-LM a n a l y s i s " .  To t h o s e  
u s i n g  t h i s  framework, t h e  phenomenon d e s c r i b e d  above i s  a  l e f t w a r d  s h i f t  i n  t h e  
IS  l o c u s .  
demand f o r  investment.  I f  c u r r e n t  investment demand f a l l s  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  a n t i -  
c ipa t ed  l a r g e  d e f i c i t s ,  aggrega te  demand and output  i s  reduced; but t h e  f a l l  i n  
investment demand a l s o  reduces borrowing p re s su re  on f i n a n c i a l  markets which 
puts  downward pressure  on i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
Consequently, Penner 's  hypothes i s  i s  a  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  but i t  does no t  suppor t  
t he  propos i t ion  t h a t  high i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  ho ld ing  back t h e  c u r r e n t  recovery.  
Indeed, Penner 's  hypothes i s  impl ies  t h a t  c u t s  i n  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  would tend t o  
r a i s e  c u r r e n t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  because lower f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  would i n c r e a s e  t h e  
demand f o r  funds.  
One can cons t ruc t  a  s cena r io  by which a  change i n  investment behavior  due 
t o  t h e  expec t a t i on  o f  high f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  f o r c e s  up  c u r r e n t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  but 
t h a t  s t o r y  has t he  oppos i te  problem: ou tput  would no t  be depressed.  The expect-  
a t i o n  o f  h igher  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  r e s u l t i n g  from f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  could prompt bus i -  
nesses  t o  a t tempt  t o  i n v e s t  now i n  o r d e r  t o  borrow while  c o s t s  were s t i l l  r e l a -  
t i v e l y  low. This  would tend t o  d r i v e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  up  sooner .  A s  one can see, 
however, t h i s  r i s e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  occurs  because o f  increased  investment de- 
mand which s t r eng thens  r a t h e r  than weakens economic a c t i v i t y .  It i s  o f  course  
t r u e  t h a t  f i rms  may not  i n v e s t  now because o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  widespread ex- 
ce s s  capac i ty ;  but  i n  t h a t  case  t h e r e  i s  no pressure  t o  r a i s e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
and the  s cena r io  s t i l l  does not  exp la in  how t h e  c u r r e n t  economy can be depressed 
by f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s .  
C .  The E f f e c t  of Prospec t ive  D e f i c i t s  on t h e  A v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  Resources f o r  
Investment 
An i n t e r n a l l y  c o n s i s t e n t  explana t ion  can be developed from t h e  suppos i t i on  
t h a t  t he  w i l l i ngnes s  t o  lend and,  t h u s ,  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  r e sou rces  f o r  in -  
vestment i s  reduced by t h e  prospect  o f  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s .  The l i k e l i h o o d  o f  
high f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  and t h e i r  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  r a i s i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  could induce 
l e n d e r s  t o  charge  h i g h e r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  c u r r e n t l y ,  s i n c e  t h e y  have t h e  o p t i o n  of 
w a i t i n g  and l e n d i n g  t h e  funds o u t  l a t e r  when they  expec t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t o  be h i g h .  
B a s i c a l l y  t h i s  means t h a t  p o t e n t i a l  c r e d i t o r s  reduce t h e  amount t h e y  a r e  w i l l i n g  t o  
l end  a t  c u r r e n t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  Businesses  would n o t  be w i l l i n g  t o  borrow a s  much 
a t  t h e  h i g h e r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  r e q u i r e d  t o  overcome t h i s  r e l u c t a n c e  o f  l e n d e r s  t o  
provide funds .  The r e s u l t i n g  r e d u c t i o n  i n  demand f o r  investment  g o a l s  would t end  
t o  d e p r e s s  t h e  economy. 
The funds  t h a t  t h e s e  p o t e n t i a l  c r e d i t o r s  would have o t h e r w i s e  provided f o r  
b u s i n e s s  investment  would have t o  be channe l led  e lsewhere .  One a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  
f o r  c r e d i t o r s  t o  hold  t h e i r  wea l th  i n  t h e  form o f  money as a  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  
assets e a r n i n g  i n t e r e s t  u n t i l  i n t e r e s t  rates r i s e  even h i g h e r  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  
The r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  would indeed be c o n t r a c t i o n a r y .  It would imply a r i s e  i n  
t h e  demand f o r  money, which i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  r e c e n t  behav ior  o f  M1 ve loc-  
i t y  ( i . e . ,  t h e  r a t e  o f  c i r c u l a t i o n  o f  money). This  v e l o c i t y  measure h a s  f a l l e n ,  
i n d i c a t i n g  a  s u r p r i s i n g  w i l l i n g n e s s  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  t o  hold  money a t  a t ime when 
i n t e r e s t  paid on e a r n i n g  a s s e t s  i s  v e r y  h i g h .  
The t r o u b l e  w i t h  t h i s  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e x p l a i n  why 
money would be t h e  a s s e t  t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  would choose a s  t h e  temporary abode o f  
i t s  wea l th  w h i l e  i t  w a i t s  f o r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t o  r i s e  f u r t h e r .  The f i n a n c i a l  
market t i g h t n e s s  t h a t  would mot iva te  t h i s  swi tch  from e a r n i n g  a s s e t s  t o  money 
i s  one t h a t  i s  expected t o  occur  l a t e r  i n  t h e  recovery  a s  t h e  l a r g e  budget de- 
f i c i t s  c l a s h  w i t h  investment  demand i n  a  t i g h t  economy. Thus, t h e  l o g i c a l  
r e s t i n g  p l a c e  f o r  l e n d e r s  t o  l e a v e  such a s s e t s  whi le  they  w a i t  f o r  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  t o  r i s e  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  would be s h o r t e r  term s e c u r i t i e s ,  n o t  money. It 
i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s a y ,  b u t  proponents o f  t h e  view t h a t  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  l a r g e  
f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  d e p r e s s  investment  may be main ta in ing  t h a t  p o t e n t i a l  l e n d e r s  
have s h i f t e d  t h e i r  weal th  i n t o  money. I f  s o ,  they a r e  posing behavior  t h a t  i s  
very d i f f i c u l t  t o  exp la in  under t he  circumstances i f  t h e  mot iva t ion  f o r  t h i s  
switching o f  a s s e t s  i s  t o  hold o u t  u n t i l  d e f i c i t s  push i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  f u r t h e r  
up i n  the  f u t u r e .  
One can exp la in  t h i s  behavior  by assuming i r r a t i o n a l i t y .  This  causes  a d i f -  
f i c u l t y  too ,  however. I f  households and bus inesses  a r e  n o t  r a t i o n a l  enough t o  
hold a s s e t s  i n  short- term s e c u r i t i e s  under t he se  circumstances,  i t  cannot  be 
r e a d i l y  assumed t h a t  they a r e  r a t i o n a l  enough t o  want t o  hold o u t  f o r  h ighe r  
y i e l d i n g  assets i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  o r  t h a t  bus inesses  a r e  r a t i o n a l  enough t o  be  
discouraged from borrowing by h igh  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
I f  t he  funds were s h i f t e d  from long t o  short- term markets ,  t h e  outcome 
would be unknown. Firms and o t h e r s  wishing t o  borrow long-term would f ace  
h igher  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  but more c r e d i t  would be a v a i l a b l e  i n  short- term 
markets ,  s t imu la t i ng  borrowing t h e r e .  Under f a i r l y  reasonable  assumptions 
about the  demand f o r  investment and money, s h i f t s  o f  funds from long t o  s h o r t  
term markets would have no e f f e c t  on ou tpu t .  But i t  i s  a l s o  pos s ib l e  t h a t  t h e  
ne t  e f f e c t  would be con t r ac t i ona ry .  And i t  i s  s i m i l a r l y  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  r e -  
s u l t  would be expansionary. The reason  f o r  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  o f  outcomes i s  t h a t  
t he  r i s e  i n  long-term i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  would be accompanied by a f a l l  i n  t h e  s h o r t -  
term r a t e s .  The two can o f f s e t  each o t h e r  t o  varying degrees .  25/ - 
It is  unknown whether a s h i f t  i n  t he  supply o f  funds from long t o  s h o r t -  
term markets a c t u a l l y  occurred dur ing  t h e  c u r r e n t  bus ines s  c y c l e .  There i s  
25/ The e f f e c t  on aggrega te  demand can be n e u t r a l  o r  even expansionary 
and yet the  s h i f t  can have d e l e t e r i o u s  e f f e c t s .  Changes i n  t h e  term s t r u c t u r e  
of i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  can a f f e c t  t he  r e l evan t  investment horizon o f  bus ines se s .  
The f u l l  imp l i ca t i ons  o f  t h i s  f o r  p roduc t iv i t y  and growth a r e  n o t  explored 
here  s i n c e  the  concern o f  t h i s  paper i s  the  l e v e l  and not  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  
economic a c t i v i t y .  
c e r t a i n l y  no ev idence  t h a t  such a  s h i f t  occur red  a t  t h e  beginning o f  t h e  con- 
t r a c t i o n .  When t h e  1981-82 c o n t r a c t i o n  began, s h o r t  r a t e s  were v e r y  h i g h ,  i n  a  
p a t t e r n  common t o  most postwar c o n t r a c t i o n .  F a l l s  i n  t h e  long r a t e  d u r i n g  t h e  
course  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t i o n  were n o t  as g r e a t  a s  one could expec t  from prev ious  
b u s i n e s s  c y c l e s .  However, t h e s e  modest d e c l i n e s  i n  long  r a t e  were n o t  accom- 
panied by g r e a t e r  t h a n  normal d rops  i n  t h e  s h o r t  r a t e  as d i c t a t e d  by t h e  hypo- 
t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e  supp ly  o f  funds were s h i f t e d  t o  shor t - t e rm makets.  
Some observes  have pointed t o  t h e  f a l l  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i n  J u l y  o f  1982 
a s  evidence t h a t  t h e  t h r e a t  o f  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  h a s  been r e t a r d i n g  demand. They 
a rgue  t h a t  t h e  a c c e l e r a t i o n  o f  money growth seemed no t  t o  have begun u n t i l  t h e  
fo l lowing  August ,  a f t e r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  began t o  f a l l ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  
f a l l  was a n  e x p e c t a t i o n s  e f f e c t  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  passage o f  t h e  Tax Equi ty  
and F i s c a l  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  Act i n  t h a t  same July--a t a x  i n c r e a s e  des igned p r in -  
c i p a l l y  t o  reduce f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  and a f f e c t  f u t u r e  c r e d i t  demand. However, a s  
shown above,  i f  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  f a l l  was due t o  t h e  p r o s p e c t i v e  t a x  i n c r e a s e ,  
one should s e e  n o t  j u s t  a  d r o p  i n  long-term r a t e s ,  but  a  r i s e  i n  s h o r t  rates. 
S h o r t  r a t e s  n o t  o n l y  f e l l  i n  t h a t  e p i s o d e ,  bu t  f e l l  by more t h a n  long  r a t e s ,  a 
p a t t e r n  i n c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  t h e  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  p r o s p e c t i v e  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  have 
s h i f t e d  funds  away from long-term marke t s .  
D. A n t i c i p a t e d  D e f i c i t s  and I n t e r e s t  Rate R i s k  Premia 
The las t  o f  t h e  f o u r  p o t e n t i a l  i n f l u e n c e s  t h a t  l a r g e  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  
might e x e r t  on c u r r e n t  a c t i v i t y  i s  through r i s k  premia a t t a c h e d  t o  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  compensate l e n d e r s  f o r  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  how 
t h e  l a r g e  d e f i c i t s  w i l l  u l t i m a t e l y  be reduced.  Much o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  
p rev ious  s e c t i o n  a p p l i e s  e q u a l l y  t o  t h i s  s c e n a r i o .  When r i s k  premia 
a r e  a t t ached  t o  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i t  i s  equ iva l en t  t o  say ing  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a 
decrease i n  the  wi l l ingness  t o  lend .  When t h i s  occurs ,  however, something 
must be done wi th  the  funds t h a t  l ende r s  a r e  d i s i n c l i n e d  t o  provide. I f  t h e  
funds a r e  spent  i n s t e a d ,  the  r e s u l t  i s  expansionary. Presumably, t h e r e f o r e ,  
proponents o f  t h i s  s cena r io  have something e l s e  i n  mind. 
The only a l t e r n a t i v e  use f o r  t he  funds i s  f o r  them t o  go i n t o  o t h e r  a s s e t s .  
A s  demonstrated above, t h e s e  o t h e r  a s s e t s  e i t h e r  have t o  be money--a move t h a t  
does not  appear cons i s t en t  with ra t iona l i ty- -or  short-term assets-a  s h i f t  t h a t  
can n e i t h e r  be de tec ted  from a v a i l a b l e  evidence nor i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  a s soc i a t ed  
with c o n t r a c t i o n .  
Moreover, t h e r e  i s  another  point  worth not ing  about hypotheses which 
depend on r i s k  premia t o  exp la in  high i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and low economic a c t i v i t y .  
When r i s k  i s  respons ib le  f o r  the  behavior o f  f i n a n c i a l  markets ,  t h e  con t r ac t ion -  
a r y  e f f e c t  i s  not r e a l l y  t he  r e s u l t  o f  expec ta t ions  r e l a t i n g  d i r e c t l y  t o  d e f i c i t  
s i z e  and growth p a t t e r n s ,  but o f  what those  d e f i c i t s  suggest  about t he  course  o f  
f u t u r e  pol icy.  The d e f i c i t s  might suggest  a f i s c a l  po l icy  ou t  o f  c o n t r o l .  They 
may inc rease  r i s k  because the re  i s  a p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  one of  t h e  methods 
the  government might use t o  d e a l  with t h e  d e f i c i t s  i s  regarded a s  unheal thy f o r  
investment.  I f  investment i s  thus  hampered by r i s k  i t  may be a n  e r r o r  t o  con- 
clude simply t h a t  t h e  d e f i c i t  must be narrowed o r  e l imina ted .  There a r e  many 
methods a v a i l a b l e  t o  policymakers f o r  reducing the  d e f i c i t .  I f  t h e  method 
chosen t o  c l o s e  the  d e f i c i t  happens t o  be t h e  one t h a t  makes i n v e s t o r s  and 
lenders  f e a r f u l  of  the  f u t u r e ,  then narrowing o r  e l imina t ing  t h e  d e f i c i t  by 
t h i s  method would only se rve  t o  make t h e  s i t u a t i o n  worse. Consequently, t h e  
propos i t ion  t h a t  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  a r e  con t r ac t iona ry  because of  u n c e r t a i n t y  and 
r i s k  premia may suggest po l icy  approaches t o  t h e  problem very  d i f f e r e n t  from 
the  o the r  hypotheses t h a t  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  reduce demand. I n  t h e  case  o f  r i s k  
premia t h e  t r u e  cause o f  i n v e s t o r  uneas iness  i s  no t  r e a l l y  t h e  d e f i c i t s ,  but 
what t he  d e f i c i t s  seem t o  say about pol icy.  
E .  Summary 
Analysis  shows t h a t  some o f  t h e  a s s e r t i o n s  about t he  e f f e c t  o f  f u t u r e  d e f i -  
c i t s  on c u r r e n t  a c t i v i t y  appear t o  have no v a l i d i t y .  The remaining hypotheses 
a r e  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  pos s ib l e  but n e c e s s a r i l y  presume t h a t  the  publ ic  a c t s  i l l o g i -  
c a l l y ,  o r  suggest  r e s u l t s  t h a t  do no t  appear  t o  be c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  a v a i l a b l e  
evidence.  This  does no t  mean t h a t  t h e  prospect  of  fu tu re  d e f i c i t s  i s  not  o r  
w i l l  not  ever  depress  aggregate  demand. However, no mat te r  how much d e t a i l  o r  
complexity i s  introduced i n t o  t he  a n a l y s i s  t o  accommodate t h e  var ious  known hy- 
potheses t h a t  d e f i c i t s  a r e  con t r ac t i ona ry ,  t h e r e  appears  t o  be n e i t h e r  compell- 
ing  t h e o r e t i c a l  reasons f o r  be l iev ing  nor empir ica l  evidence support ing the  
no t ion  t h a t  t h e  prospect  o f  l a r g e  d e f i c i t s  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  depresses  cu r r en t  
economic a c t i v i t y .  
111. THE ROLE OF DEFICITS LATER I N  THE RECOVERY 
Given t h e  preponderance o f  evidence and t h e o r e t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  t h a t  shows 
d e f i c i t s  t o  be expansionary,  i t  would appear  t h a t  c u r r e n t  concern wi th  them 
i s  not based on t h e i r  e f f e c t s  on aggrega te  demand. The U.S. economy i s  
c u r r e n t l y  w e l l  below v i r t u a l l y  anyone's d e f i n i t i o n  o f  f u l l  employment. The 
expansion o f  aggregate  demand r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  d e f i c i t  ha s  
l i k e l y  had t h e  e f f e c t  o f  he lp ing  t o  moderate t h e  c o n t r a c t i o n  and speed t h e  re- 
covery. In  s p i t e  o f  t he se  l i k e l y  d e s i r a b l e  e f f e c t s ,  t h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  reasons  why 
t h e  budget d e f i c i t s  p ro jec ted  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e  might no t  be d e s i r a b l e :  (1) t h e  de- 
f i c i t s  may become too expansionary and r e s u l t  i n  i n f l a t i o n ;  ( 2 )  t hey  may reduce 
aggrega te  supply and slow long-run c a p a c i t y  growth, and ( 3 )  t h e i r  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
e f f e c t s  on var ious  s e c t o r s  o f  t h e  economy might outweigh t h e i r  s a l u t a r y  agg rega t e  
e f f e c t s  . 
A .  The I n f l a t i o n a r y  E f f e c t s  of D e f i c i t s  
Since l a r g e  d e f i c i t s  a r e  expected t o  cont inue  i n t o  t h e  fo r seeab le  f u t u r e ,  
i t  has  been argued t h a t  they w i l l  u l t i m a t e l y  be t oo  expansionary.  The economy 
w i l l  reach f u l l  employment and t h i s  expansion w i l l  g ene ra t e  on ly  a c c e l e r a t i n g  
i n f l a t i o n .  However, t h e  l i k l i h o o d  o f  t h i s  i n f l a t i o n  s c e n a r i o  i s  ques t i onab le .  
Technica l ly  speaking,  i t  i s  no t  t he  e x i s t e n c e  of  a d e f i c i t  t h a t  i s  expan- 
s ionary ;  i t  i s  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  i t s  s i z e  t h a t  t ends  t o  push u p  agg rega t e  demand. 
I n f l a t i o n ,  however, i s  t h e  cont inuous i n c r e a s e  i n  pr ices-- that  i s ,  p r i c e s  ris- 
i n g  aga in  and aga in  per iod a f t e r  per iod a s  opposed t o  simply moving once t o  a 
new, higher  l e v e l .  Hence, f o r  i n f l a t i o n  t o  occu r ,  aggrega te  demand must grow 
cont inuously.  - 26/ D e f i c i t s  produce t h i s  e f f e c t  by growing. A d e f i c i t  o f  some 
cons tan t  s i z e ,  maintained period a f t e r  per iod,  should not  be expected t o  expand 
aggregate  demand. 
The t a x  c u t s  enacted by t h e  Economic Recovery and Tax Act o f  1981 were 
s e t  up t o  phase i n  over t h e  period 1981-83. One would expect  t h a t  t h e i r  e f f e c t  
on the  f u l l  employment d e f i c i t  would occur pr imar i ly  dur ing  t h e  1981-84 period 
and leave  t h e  d e f i c i t  measure r e l a t i v e l y  unaf fec ted  t h e r e a f t e r .  However, some 
of t he  i nc reases  i n  expendi tures ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  f o r  defense ,  a r e  expected t o  
p e r s i s t ,  tending t o  i nc rease  t h e  budget d e f i c i t s  beyond 1984 r i g h t  through the  
end of  c u r r e n t  p ro j ec t i ons  i n  1988. 
Est imates  by t h e  Congressional Budget Of f i ce  (CBO) o f  t h e  s tandard ized  
employment d e f i c i t  ( t h e i r  ve r s ion  o f  t h e  f u l l  employment d e f i c i t  wi th  f u l l  em- 
ployment def ined a t  6 percent)  shed some l i g h t  on t h i s .  - 2 7 /  Even though t h e  
CBO e s t ima te  o f  t h e  s tandard ized  employment d e f i c i t  a s  a  proport ion o f  p o t e n t i a l  
output  grows throughout t he  f i v e  year  p ro j ec t i ons ,  thereby adding s t imulus  each 
y e a r ,  t h a t  s t imulus  d e c l i n e s  dur ing  t h e  f i n a l  yea r s  i n  which t h e  economy 
approaches capac i ty .  Moreover, those  i nc reases  i n  t h e  f u l l  employment d e f i c i t  
a r e  no t  unprecedented. The d e f i c i t s  p ro jec ted  by t h e  CBO a n a l y s i s  a r e  very 
l a r g e ,  but t he  s t imulus they add t o  t h e  economy l a t e  i n  t he  recovery i s  no t  out  
o f  t h e  range o f  h i s t o r i c a l  experience.  
Est imates  o f  Data Resources,  I nc .  i n d i c a t e  a  more dramatic  l e v e l i n g  o f f  
of t h e  f u l l  employment d e f i c i t .  Their  f u l l  employment budget model (with 
26/ The d i scus s ion  here  i s  o f  d e f i c i t s  and aggregate  demand. Obviously 
i n f l a x o n  could a l s o  be caused by o t h e r  sources  o f  demand s h i f t s  o r  by con- 
t inuous s h i f t s  i n  supply a s  we l l .  
27/ Congressional Budget Of f i ce .  Outlook f o r  Economic Recovery. Report 
t o  t h T s e n a t e  and House Committee on t h e  Budget, P a r t  I .  February 1983. p.65 .  
f u l l  employment def ined  a s  a  6.1 percent  unemployment r a t e )  shows t h e  f u l l  
employment d e f i c i t  a s  a  percentage o f  p o t e n t i a l  GNP peaking i n  1986 and then  
dec l in ing .  28/ Hence, t h e r e  i s  some i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  f i s c a l  po l i cy  w i l l  c ea se  -
t o  be expansionary before  f u l l  employment ou tput  i s  reached ,  i n d i c a t i n g  l i t t l e  
i n f l a t i o n a r y  t h r e a t  from f u t u r e  l a r g e  d e f i c i t s .  The monetary a u t h o r i t i e s  might 
choose t o  p a r t i a l l y  f inance  t h e  d e f i c i t s  by means o f  money c r e a t i o n ,  and cause 
i n f l a t i o n  t h a t  way; but  t h e  d e f i c i t s  themselves appear  t o  pose l i t t l e  o f  such 
t h r e a t .  
Thus, i n  s t r i c t l y  aggrega te  terms,  we should expect  t h e  pro jec ted  d e f i c t s  
t o  expand t h e  economy but  t o  l o s e  t h a t  expansionary t h r u s t  by t h e  t i m e  t h a t  
capac i ty  i s  approached. Presumably, i f  t h e s e  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  a r e  t o  have 
d e l e t e r i o u s  e f f e c t s  l a t e r  on i n  t h e  recovery ,  t h e s e  e f f e c t s  must e i t h e r  be i n  
terms o f  aggrega te  supply,  o r  i n  terms of  t h e i r  e f f e c t s  on c e r t a i n  d i s agg rega t ed ,  
i n d i v i d u a l  s e c t o r s  o f  t h e  economy. A s  w i l l  be ev iden t  from t h e  a n a l y s i s  below, 
t he se  two e f f e c t s  a r e  c l o s e l y  a s s o c i a t e d .  
B.  D e f i c i t s  and t h e  Al loca t ion  of Output 
D e f i c i t s ,  more than j u s t  being r e l a t e d  t o  aggrega te  demand, a r e  a l s o  re- 
l a t e d  t o  t he  a l l o c a t i o n  o r  composition o f  ou tpu t .  I f  t h e  government c u t s  
t axes ,  even though the t o t a l  amount o f  resources  i t  uses  f o r  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  
may be t h e  same, t h e  way i t  o b t a i n s  those  r e sou rces  changes.  Taxing typ i -  
c a l l y  reduces t h e  amount o f  consumption ou t  o f  a g iven  l e v e l  o f  income more 
than anything e l s e .  Government borrowing, however, comes o u t  o f  t h e  f low o f  
sav ing ,  l e av ing  l e s s  o f  t h a t  sav ing  l e f t  over  f o r  investment .  
28/ S i n a i ,  A.  and Rath jens ,  P. D e f i c i t s ,  I n t e r e s t  Ra t e s ,  and t h e  Economy. 
Data Resources Economic S tud ie s .  S e r i e s  No. 113. June 1983. 
I n  a pe r iod  o f  s l a c k  demand, t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  borrowing a r e  n o t  s o  impor tan t  
t o  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  of o u t p u t ;  t h e  Government can borrow wi thou t  major r e d u c t i o n s  
i n  investment  because unemployed r e s o u r c e s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t h e  purpose o f  
s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  demands o f  t h e  Government. Indeed,  d u r i n g  p e r i o d s  o f  
ve ry  low economic a c t i v i t y  investment  can even be expected t o  r i s e  a s  a r e s u l t  
of a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  d e f i c i t .  Th i s  o c c u r s  i f  t h e  s a l u t a r y  e f f e c t s  o f  i n c r e a s e d  
a g g r e g a t e  demand on income and ,  hence,  t h e  demand f o r  p l a n t  and equipment,  ou t -  
weigh t h e  d e p r e s s i n g  e f f e c t s  o f  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  on investment  demand. 
I f  t h e  economy i s  a t  p o t e n t i a l  o u t p u t ,  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n a l  e f f e c t s  o f  d e f i c i t  
f i n a n c i n g  a r e  s t r o n g e s t .  Government borrowing under such c i rcumstances  w i l l  
a lmos t  a lways reduce  inves tment .  Unless  t h e  h i g h e r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  coax f o r t h  
a d d i t i o n a l  s a v i n g  o r  l o a n s  from abroad ,  investment  w i l l  be reduced d o l l a r  f o r  
d o l l a r  f o r  a l l  a d d i t i o n a l  Government borrowing. I f  t h e  borrowing i s  t o  f i n a n c e  
g r e a t e r  government e x p e n d i t u r e s  t h e  r e s u l t  ( a t  c a p a c i t y )  would be a s h i f t  i n  
o u t p u t  from inves tment  t o  government. I f  t h e  borrowing i s  t o  cover  t h e  s h o r t -  
f a l l  o f  revenues  r e s u l t i n g  from a t a x  c u t ,  investment  w i l l  d e c l i n e  a s  consump- 
t i o n  r i s e s  i n  response  t o  h i g h e r  a f t e r - t a x  income. 
Th is  a l l o c a t i o n a l  e f f e c t  accounts  f o r  t h r e e  v e r y  b a s i c  concerns  about  t h e  
d e f i c i t .  F i r s t ,  t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  d e f i c i t s  a r e  c o n t r a c t i o n a r y  may be a r e s u l t  
o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  l a r g e  changes i n  d e f i c i t s  r e a l l o c a t e  demand. Even though i n -  
c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  d e f i c i t  t end  t o  be expans ionary ,  i t  i s  o n l y  because t h e  expan- 
s i o n  o f  consumption o r  government demand o f f s e t s  any d e p r e s s i n g  e f f e c t s  on o t h e r  
s e c t o r s  o f  t h e  economy. I f  one views t h e  economy from t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  one 
o f  t h e  s e c t o r s  a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  caused by Govern- 
ment borrowing t o  cover  i t s  s h o r t f a l l  o f  revenues  below e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  a growing 
d e f i c i t  does  seem t o  be d e p r e s s i n g .  That i s  because such a n  o u t l o o k  does  n o t  
encompass t h e  o f f s e t t i n g  g a i n s  i n  employment and s a l e s  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r i e s  t h a t  
a r e  helped by t h e  expansionary f i s c a l  po l icy .  I f  one ' s  po in t  o f  view i s  t h a t  of 
the  a u t o ,  s t e e l ,  housing o r  s i m i l a r  i n t e r e s t  s e n s i t i v e - i n d u s t r i e s ,  o r  t h a t  o f  
a n  expor t  o r  import competing f i rm ,  then d e f i c i t s  w i l l  indeed seem con t r ac t i on -  
ary-a f a c t  t h a t  would not  be t r u e  f o r  t h e  economy a s  a  whole. - 29/ 
The second concern r e l a t e d  t o  t h i s  a l l o c a t i o n a l  e f f e c t  i s  wi th  t h e  growth 
of t h e  economy's capac i ty  t o  produce. I f  investment i s  reduced by t h e  amount 
o f  Government borrowing, c a p i t a l  formation and p r o d u c t i v i t y  growth can  be  ex- 
pected t o  slow. The s i g n i f i c a n c e  of  t h i s  e f f e c t  w i l l  be d i s cus sed  i n  more de- 
t a i l  i n  t h e  next  s e c t i o n .  I t  i s  a n  important  concern and has  been t h e  focus of  
much o f  t he  p ro fe s s iona l  economics d i s cus s ion  of  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  d e f i c i t .  
The important  p o i n t s  t o  no t e  a r e  t h a t  t h e  phenomenon i s  a  long-run e f f e c t ,  t h a t  
it a r i s e s  pr imar i ly  from d e f i c i t s  run a t  c a p a c i t y  o u t p u t ,  and t h a t  i t  i s  a sup- 
p ly  r a t h e r  than  a  demand e f f e c t .  
The f i n a l  e f f e c t  o f  t he  a l l o c a t i o n a l  s h i f t  caused by d e f i c i t  f inance  
i s  t h e  l o s s  o f  ou tput  r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  adjustment  o f  t h e  economy t o  t h e  new 
p a t t e r n  of  demand. Examination o f  va r ious  ana lyses  o f  t h e  d e f i c i t s '  impact on 
t h e  recovery i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h i s  e f f e c t  i m p l i c i t l y  u n d e r l i e s  much o f  t h e  d i s cus -  
s i o n  on the  sub jec t  and has  r e s u l t e d  i n  cons iderab le  confusion about  t h e  r o l e  
o f  t h e  d e f i c i t s  i n  t h e  recovery.  
Explained b r i e f l y ,  resources  do not  f low c o s t l e s s l y  from one s e c t o r  o f  t h e  
economy t o  another .  Consequently,  a  jump i n  t h e  demand f o r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  good 
does not  immediately c a l l  f o r t h  a l l  product ive c a p a c i t y  necessary  t o  supply  i t .  
2 9 /  Even a t  t h a t ,  d e f i c i t s  may be g e t t i n g  t h e  blame f o r  problems caused 
by o t h e r  phenomena. The a u t o  i n d u s t r y ,  f o r  example, ha s  problems o f  a  s e c u l a r  
na tu re  un re l a t ed  t o  d e f i c i t  o r  r eces s ion .  Lower i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  may i n c r e a s e  de- 
mand f o r  a u t o s .  But they should a l s o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  i n d u s t r y ' s  investment  i n  new 
c a p i t a l .  The l a t t e r  e f f e c t  of  e l imina t ing  jobs could outweigh t h e  former e f f e c t  
o f  c r e a t i n g  them' 
Such a s h i f t  t a k e s  t i m e .  P r i c e s  must u s u a l l y  r i s e ,  r a i s i n g  wages and r a t e s  of 
r e t u r n  t o  s i g n a l  and mot iva te  t h e  movements o f  l a b o r  and c a p i t a l  i n t o  v a r i o u s  
i n d u s t r i e s  t h a t  need them. The ad jus tment  t o  t h i s  s h i f t  i n  demand t a k e s  t ime 
and c o s t s  r e s o u r c e s  i n  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n .  
S u b s t a n t i a l l y  l a r g e r  d e f i c i t s  w i l l  s e t  new p a t t e r n s  o f  demand i n  which t h e  
demand f o r  hous ing ,  consumer d u r a b l e s  , e x p o r t s ,  import  competing goods and some 
investment  f a l l s  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  demand f o r  o t h e r  goods,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  consump- 
t i o n  and d e f e n s e .  Th is  s h i f t  i n  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  demand c r e a t e s  a n  unbalanced 
recovery  i n  which some i n d u s t r i e s  encounte r  supp ly  c o n s t r a i n t s  long  b e f o r e  o t h e r s .  
E s s e n t i a l l y ,  some o f  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  c a p a b l e  o f  producing o u t p u t  w i l l  be l o c a t e d  
i n  t h e  wrong p l a c e s .  The t ime i t  w i l l  t a k e  f o r  t h e s e  r e s o u r c e s  t o  move where 
t h e y  a r e  i n  demand w i l l  mean t h a t  f r i c t i o n a l  unemployment o f  r e s o u r c e s ,  inc lud-  
i n g  l a b o r ,  w i l l  rise. That i s ,  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  economy t o  produce w i l l  be 
lower under  t h e  new unaccustomed p a t t e r n  o f  demand t h a n  under t h e  old--at  l e a s t  
u n t i l  t h e  ad jus tment  t o  t h e  new p a t t e r n  o f  demand i s  complete.  
T h i s  i s  n o t  a new phenomenon. Presumably i t  o c c u r s  whenever f i s c a l  o r  
monetary p o l i c y  i s  used t o  boost  t h e  economy, t i l t i n g  demand away from c e r t a i n  
p a t t e r n s  t h a t  e x i s t e d  p r e v i o u s l y  o r  t h a t  might e x i s t  once t h e  economy r e a c h e s  
t h e  d e s i r e d  l e v e l  o f  o u t p u t .  I n  t h e  p a s t ,  l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  was paid t o  t h i s  
phenomenon. - 30/ However, t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e s e  p r o j e c t e d  d e f i c i t s ,  and t h e i r  per- 
s i s t e n c e  over  s e v e r a l  y e a r s  may make t h e s e  demand s h i f t s  and t h e i r  e f f e c t  on 
c a p a c i t y  a c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i n  t h i s  r ecovery .  Indeed ,  t h i s  demand s h i f t  e f f e c t  
30/ It has  not  been t o t a l l y  i g n o r e d ,  though. It has  been a c r i t i c i s m  d i -  
r e c t e d  a t  c o u n t e r c y c l i c a l  p o l i c y  by members o f  t h e  A u s t r i a n  School o f  Economics. 
See O f D r i s c o l l ,  Gerald  P. Jr . ,  and Sudhia R. Shenoy, I n f l a t i o n ,  Recess ion and 
S t a g f l a t i o n  i n  The Foundat ions  o f  Modern A u s t r i a n  Economics. Edwin G .  Dolan,  ed . 
Sheed and Ward I n c .  Kansas C i t y .  1976. pp. 185-211. 
would p a r t i a l l y  e x p l a i n  t h e  emphasis some o b s e r v e r s  have p laced  on t h e  unpre- 
cedented s i z e  o f  t h e  d e f i c i t s  and would account  f o r  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n ,  a s s e r t e d  
by some a n a l y s t s ,  t h a t  t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  l a r g e  d e f i c i t s  w i l l  " a b o r t "  t h e  r e -  
covery.  
"Abort" i s  probably  a n  u n f o r t u n a t e  c h o i c e  o f  t e rms ;  a s  s e e n  from t h e  a n a l y s i s  
i n  t h e  f i r s t  s e c t i o n ,  t h i s  a s s e r t i o n  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  unders tand  i n  i t s  conven- 
t i o n a l  s e n s e  a s  a n  a g g r e g a t e  demand phenomenon. There i s  no p a r t i c u l a r  r e a s o n  
t o  expec t  t h e  d e f i c i t s  t o  suddenly  become c o n t r a c t i o n a r y  a t  some p o i n t  i n  t h e  
recovery .  What i s  probably  meant by such a s t a t e m e n t  i s  t h a t  t h e  economy w i l l  
r e a c h  a supp ly  c o n s t r a i n t  w e l l  b e f o r e  i t  r e a c h e s  a  l e v e l  o f  unemployment con- 
s i s t e n t  w i t h  what i s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  f u l l  employment as a  r e s u l t  
o f  t h e  ad jus tment  problem j u s t  d e s c r i b e d .  
For example, i n  t h e  Brookings s t u d y ,  S e t t i n g  N a t i o n a l  P r i o r i t i e s :  The 1984 
Budget,  i t  i s  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  imbalance between government r e c e i p t s  and expendi-  
t u r e s  w i l l  "...undermine p r o s p e c t s  f o r  recovery  from t h e  most s e r i o u s  economic 
slowdown s i n c e  World War 11." 311 However, t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  Brookings con- -
elusion appear  t o  be supp ly  r a t h e r  t h a n  demand r e l a t e d :  
" I n  s h o r t ,  t h e  d i r e c t  r e s u l t  o f  l a r g e  F e d e r a l  budget d e f i c i t s  would 
be a  h i g h  consumption-low investment  economy t h a t  would t end  t o  grow 
s l o w l y ,  run  p e r s i s t e n t  d e f i c i t s  i n  t r a d e  w i t h  o t h e r  n a t i o n s ,  and encounte r  
i n d u s t r i a l  b o t t l e n e c k s  (because  o f  low i n v e s t m e n t )  b e f o r e  f u l l  employment 
o f  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  i s  reached".  321 - 
S i m i l a r l y ,  i n  t h i s  y e a r ' s  Economic Report  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  t h e  Counc i l  o f  
Economic Advisors  S t a t e s :  
311 Pechman, J o s e p h ,  ed .  S e t t i n g  Nat iona l  P r i o r i t i e s ,  t h e  1984 Budget.  
~ r o o - E n ~ s  I n s t i t u t i o n ,  Washington, D.C.  1983, p. 14.  
321 S e t t i n g  Nat iona l  P r i o r i t i e s ,  p. 14.  -. - 
"A " lops ided"  recovery  i n  which some s e c t o r s  remained r e l a t i v e l y  
depressed  might prove more f r a g i l e  t h a n  a  recovery  which was b r o a d l y  
based.  An i n c r e a s e  i n  economic a c t i v i t y  l i m i t e d  t o  some s e c t o r s  and 
r e g i o n s  might r e s u l t  i n  g r e a t e r  upward p r e s s u r e  on p r i c e s  and wages 
a t  any g i v e n  l e v e l  o f  t o t a l  o u t p u t  and employment t h a n  would be t h e  
c a s e  i f  t h e r e  were balanced expansion among i n d u s t r i e s . "  33/ -
The r e d u c t i o n  i n  c a p a c i t y ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  would n o t  be a  permanent c o n d i t i o n .  
D e f i c i t s  over  a n  extended per iod o f  t ime w i l l  s e t  new p a t t e r n s  o f  demand t h a t  
w i l l  s h i f t  r e s o u r c e s  from i n t e r e s t - s e n s i t i v e  s e c t o r s  t o  consumption,  and t h e  
f r i c t i o n a l  unemployment o f  l a b o r  and o t h e r  r e s o u r c e s  w i l l  f a l l  a f t e r  t h e  ad- 
jus tment  i s  complete .  34/  Yet ,  i f  a t  some p o i n t  a  few y e a r s  from now i t  i s  our  -
i n t e n t i o n  t o  e l i m i n a t e  t h e  d e f i c i t s ,  demand can then  be expected t o  s h i f t  back  
towards i n t e r e s t - s e n s i t i v e  s e c t o r s  o f  t h e  economy. I f ,  i n  t h e  meantime, t h e s e  
s e c t o r s  have been depressed  due t o  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  rates, t h e  r e s o u r c e s  t o  pro- 
duce t h e s e  goods w i l l  have moved t o  a n o t h e r  p l a c e .  The c o s t l y ,  t ime consuming 
process  o f  s h i f t i n g  r e s o u r c e s  w i l l  need t o  be under taken a g a i n ,  w i t h  a  conse- 
quen t  rise i n  f r i c t i o n a l  unemployment. 
These a l l o c a t i o n a l  e f f e c t s  appear  t o  be t h e  c e n t r a l  r eason  f o r  t h e  concern 
w i t h  t h e  d e f i c i t s  p r o j e c t e d  over  t h e  n e x t  f i v e  y e a r s .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  much o f  
t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  about  them h a s  been clouded by a  confus ion  o f  a g g r e g a t e  demand 
and supp ly  e f f e c t s .  While t h e  compos i t iona l  s h i f t s  i n  o u t p u t  can l e a v e  t h e  i m -  
p r e s s i o n  t h a t  d e f i c i t s  tend t o  be c o n t r a c t i o n a r y ,  i n  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  t h e  e f f e c t  
o f  t h e s e  s h i f t s  on demand i s  expansionary.  The l i k e l y  s o u r c e  o f  any c o n s t r a i n t  
on t h e  recovery i s  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  d e f i c i t s  on supp ly .  The p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  
t h e s e  s h i f t s  w i l l  r a i s e  f r i c t i o n a l  unemployment l i e s  behind t h e  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  
33/ pp. 28 -
34/  This  a p p l i e s  o n l y  t o  t h e  f r i c t i o n a l  unemployment o f  r e s o u r c e s .  Any 
r e d u x i o n  i n  c a p a c i t y  due t o  low inves tment  would p e r s i s t .  
they w i l l  a b o r t  t h e  recovery.  Consequently,  wh i l e  economic t heo ry  and evidence 
c o n t r a d i c t  t he  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  t he  d e f i c i t s  expected t o  occur  later  du r ing  t h e  
expansion w i l l  somehow choke o f f  demand and s t o p  t h e  recovery ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  
t h a t  t he se  d e f i c i t s  w i l l  have the  e f f e c t  o f  making t h e  achievement o f  c a p a c i t y  
occur  a t  a lower l e v e l  o f  employment o r  ou tpu t  than  might be t h e  c a s e  o therwise .  
I n  t h i s  sense  t he  d e f i c i t s  might be s a i d  t o  have t h e  p o t e n t i a l  t o  a b o r t  t h e  ex- 
pansion. However, t h i s  use  o f  t h e  word "abor t"  i s  very  d i f f e r e n t  from i t s  more 
popular and t r a d i t i o n a l  use implying t h e  c e s s a t i o n  o f  aggrega te  demand growth. 

I V .  CONCEPTUAL ISSUES RELATED TO REDUCING THE DEFICITS 
It would seem t o  be p a r t i c u l a r l y  i r o n i c  t h a t  supply-side t a x  c u t s  designed 
t o  expand t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  economy would have among t h e i r  p r i n c i p a l  e f f e c t s  
a reduc t ion  i n  capac i ty  o u t p u t ,  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  f r i c t i o n a l  unemployment, and a 
reduc t ion  i n  investment .  The c u t s  were supposed t o  boost  c a p a c i t y  and long- 
term growth, not  depress  i t .  I n  some ways t h i s  perverse  outcome i s  t h e  r e s u l t  
o f  two popular f a l l a c i e s  t h a t  cha rac t e r i zed  much o f  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  t a x  
c u t s  when they were f i r s t  proposed. The f i r s t  i s  t h e  no t ion  t h a t  t h e  c o s t  o f  
Government c o n s i s t s  o f  t h e  t a x e s  i t  imposes on t h e  economy. The second i s  t h e  
i d e a  t h a t  t h e  drag these  t axes  c r e a t e  on t h e  economy i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  propor- 
t i o n  o f  income t h a t  t h e s e  t axes  take  up. 
In  r e a l i t y ,  t he  c o s t  o f  Government i s  no t  measured by t h e  t a x e s  i t  e x t r a c t s  
from t h e  economy, bu t  by i t s  expenditures--the resources  i t  uses  up. These 
resources  are secured by one o f ,  o r  a combination o f ,  t h r e e  means: by t ax ing  
d i r e c t l y ,  by borrowing, and by money c r e a t i o n  (which e s s e n t i a l l y  imposes a 
so-cal led " in f l a t i on - t ax , "  which e x t r a c t s  resources  from t h e  publ ic  by reducing 
t h e  va lue  o f  people 's  money hold ings) .  
The last o f  t he se  t h r e e  methods was l a r g e l y  foresworn when a s e r i o u s  a n t i -  
i n f l a t i o n  po l icy  was adopted. Thus, u n l e s s  c u t s  i n  t a x  r a t e s  could a c t u a l l y  
y i e l d  i nc reases  i n  t a x  revenues,  then government borrowing i s  needed t o  meet 
t h e  l e v e l  o f  expendi tures .  Many were poss ib ly  l e d  t o  b e l i e v e  such revenue e f -  
f e c t s  could fo l low r a t e  c u t s  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  be l i ev ing  t h e  second f a l l a c y ,  t h a t  
i s ,  t h a t  t h e  drag  t h a t  t axes  impose on t h e  economy i s  r e l a t e d  t o  how much r a t h e r  
than how t h e  publ ic  i s  taxed.  However, i t  i s  no t  t axes  per s e  t h a t  cause d i s -  --
i ncen t ives  and r e t a r d  e f f i c i e n c y  and growth; it  i s  the  unevenness with which 
t h e  t axes  a r e  imposed on d i f f e r e n t  endeavors t h a t  causes  i n e f f i c i e n c y .  A lump 
sum t a x ,  f o r  example, which i s  assessed  on everyone r ega rd l e s s  o f  how much they 
work, save ,  e a r n ,  o r  produce, can be increased  o r  decreased without a f f e c t i n g  
e f f i c i e n c y  because i t  does not  make any kind of  a c t i v i t y  more a t t r a c t i v e  than 
another .  35/ Output l o s s  from t a x a t i o n  r e s u l t s  only i f  some a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  taxed -
more heav i ly  than o t h e r  a c t i v i t i e s .  D i f f e r e n t i a l  t reatment  i n  t a x a t i o n  can make 
uneconomic investment worthwhile; i t  can make output  producing a c t i v i t i e s  unat- 
t r a c t i v e ;  and i t  can channel productive e f f o r t  i n t o  nonproductive endeavors.  
Of course ,  some a c t i v i t i e s  cannot be taxed.  Le isure  appears  t o  be inher-  
e n t l y  untaxable .  "Psychic income," t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o r  o the r  nonpecuniary com- 
pensat ion one r ece ives  from a job i s  a l s o  impossible  t o  t a x .  Given t h i s  f a c t ,  
economic d i s t o r t i o n  i s  minimized by t ax ing  most heav i ly  those  endeavors which 
a r e  l e a s t  responsive t o  t h e  h igher  c o s t .  A c t i v i t i e s  which a r e  very s e n s i t i v e  
t o  changes i n  c o s t  should then be taxed t h e  l e a s t .  
Seen from t h i s  perspec t ive ,  t h e  supply-side t a x  c u t s  were designed i n  such 
a way a s  t o  reduce only two o f  t he se  t ax  d i f f e r e n t i a l s ,  t he  h igher  r a t e  a t  which 
saving i s  taxed r e l a t i v e  t o  spending, and t h e  h igher  r a t e  t h a t  work i s  taxed re-  
l a t i v e  t o  l e i s u r e .  The many t a x  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  among types o f  a s s e t s ,  i n d u s t r i e s ,  
and incomes were l a r g e l y  ignored by t h e  t a x  reform. This  focus on saving and 
working i s ,  i n  many ways, s u r p r i s i n g ;  fo r  o f  a l l  t he  d i f f e r e n t  economic dec i s ions  
35/ This d i s cus s ion  i s  l imi t ed  t o  e f f i c i e n c y  e f f e c t s ,  s i n c e  they were the  
f o c u s y f  debate  over t h e  t a x  reform. Obviously e q u i t y  o r  f a i r n e s s  considera-  
t i o n s  a r e  a l s o  important  elements o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  of  t a x a t i o n .  This  exp la in s  
why t h e  "lump sum" t a x  i n  no t  s e r i o u s l y  considered a s  a revenue source i n  
modern economies. 
t h a t  a r e  in f luenced  by t axa t ion2  i t  i s  imposs ib le  t o  know t h e o r e t i c a l l y  how 
t a x a t i o n  a f f e c t s  t he  l abo r - l e i su re  and the  saving-spending cho ices .  An i n c r e a s e  
on t h e  r e t u r n  t o  saving may make u s  want t o  save more, bu t  i t  a l s o  i n c r e a s e s  our  
l i f e t i m e  income, making us  tend t o  spend more ou t  o f  c u r r e n t  income and reduce 
sav ing  a s  a r e s u l t .  An i n c r e a s e  i n  our  take-home pay may encourage u s  t o  work 
more, but i t  may provide u s  wi th  t h e  e x t r a  income t o  t a k e  more l e i s u r e  and work 
l e s s  i n s t e a d .  There i s  some evidence t o  show t h a t  sav ing  w i l l  r i s e  when t h e  
a f t e r - t a x  r e t u r n  on it rises. Among secondary workers ( i . e . ,  a d d i t i o n a l  workers 
from a household t h a t  a l r e a d y  has  a p r i n c i p a l  e a r n e r )  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e r e  i s  
ample evidence t h a t  work i n c e n t i v e s  i nc rease  wi th  h ighe r  pay. However, none o f  
t h e  empi r i ca l  evidence i n d i c a t e s  a respons iveness  o f  e i t h e r  t h a t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  
t o  r a i s e  revenues a s  a r e s u l t  of  t h e  t a x  c u t .  C e r t a i n l y  t h e  evidence i n d i c a t e s  
t h a t  t he se  a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  no t  n e a r l y  s o  s e n s i t i v e  t o  t a x  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  a s  many 
o t h e r  economic endeavors.  
For t he se  t a x  c u t s  t o  have decreased t h e  c o s t  o f  government, t hey  would 
have had t o  i n c r e a s e  e f f i c i e n c y  by more t han  any dec rease  i n  e f f i c i e n c y  re-  
s u l t i n g  from t h e  Government borrowing t h a t  they n e c e s s i t a t e d .  A t  t h e  s imp le s t  
l e v e l ,  one might expect t h a t  every d o l l a r  o f  Government borrowing t h a t  occurs  
a t  c apac i ty  output  w i l l  squeeze ou t  a d o l l a r  o f  investment .  Assuming t h i s  r e -  
l a t i o n s h i p ,  i f  t h e  d e f i c i t  i s  around 4 112 percent  o f  GNP and t o t a l  sav ing  
hovers around i t s  h i s t o r i c a l  norm o f  15 percent  o f  GNP, t h i s  would appear  t o  
imply a h e f t y  r educ t ion  i n  p o t e n t i a l  growth. 36/ However, t h e r e  a r e  two o r  -
t h r e e  cons ide ra t i ons  t h a t  suggest  t he  a c t u a l  impact on growth w i l l  be less 
36/ A t  c apac i ty .  See Denison, E .  A Note on P r i v a t e  Saving. Review o f  
~ c o n o z c s  and S t a t i s t i c s .  August 1958. p. 261-67; and David, P. and Scadding, 
J. Pr iva t e  Saving; U l t r a r a t i o n a l i t y ,  Aggregation, and "Denison's Law". Jou rna l  
o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy. Apr i l  1974. pp. 27-49. 
dramatic .  F i r s t ,  when a l l  forms of  sav ing  a r e  properly accounted f o r ,  a c t u a l  
saving i n  t he  economy exceeds 15 percent o f  GNP. For example, a number o f  com- 
ponents counted as consumption a r e  a c t u a l l y  saving; purchases o f  consumer dura- 
b l e s ,  investment i n  research  and development, and most educa t iona l  expendi tures .  
Hence, when t h e s e  o t h e r  components o f  saving a r e  considered t h e  d e f i c i t s  pro- 
jec ted  over t he  next f i v e  years  a r e  much smal le r  proport ions of  g ros s  saving 
than they a t  f i r s t  appear .  
Moreover, t h e  p r i n c i p a l  crowding out  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  pro jec ted  d e f i c i t s  w i l l  
probably no t  have much e f f e c t  on t h e  aggrega te  l e v e l  o f  investment i n  p lan t  and 
equipment. Higher i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  caused by Government borrowing w i l l  tend t o  
be o f f s e t  by reduc t ions  i n  t h e  t a x  r a t e  on t h e  r e t u r n  t o  c a p i t a l  (such a s  re-  
s u l t e d  from the  more l i b e r a l  cos t  recovery allowed by t h e  corpora te  t a x  c u t s ) .  
Hence, t h e  c o s t  of  investment t o  f i rms  may not  r i s e  by much i f  a t  a l l .  The i n -  
vestment t h a t  w i l l  tend t o  be crowded out by government borrowing w i l l  be 
owner-occupied housing and consumer durab les .  Since t h e  r e t u r n s  on these  a r e  
not  taxed,  i t  w i l l  be household investment t h a t  w i l l  f e e l  t he  f u l l  i nc rease  
o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  changes. To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  crowding o u t  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  house- 
hold investment t he re  w i l l  presumably be less e f f e c t  on t he  growth of  product ive 
capac i ty  than i f  bus iness  p l an t  and equipment investment were crowded o u t .  
An a d d i t i o n a l  cons ide ra t i on  i s  t h a t  saving may respond t o  changes i n  i n t e r -  
e s t  r a t e s  s o  t h a t  a n e t  i nc rease  w i l l  occur  i n  t h e  resources  made a v a i l a b l e  f o r  
investment and Government borrowing. Short o f  t h i s ,  t h e r e  a r e  t he  e f f e c t s  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c a p i t a l  f lows. These flows make c a p i t a l  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  Government 
borrowing and investment even i f  domestic saving s t a y s  f i xed .  Productive capa- 
c i t y  can grow a t  t h e  same time the  Government borrows t o  f inance  i t s  d e f i c i t s .  
F i n a l l y ,  one should cons ider  t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  changes involved.  P roduc t iv i t y  
growth averaged n e a r l y  t h r e e  percent  a year  p r i o r  t o  i t s  r e c e n t  slowdown. - 37/ 
Es t imates  o f  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  c a p i t a l  formation t o  t h i s  growth have ranged 
from only a f i f t h  t o  about h a l f  o f  t h i s  growth. - 38/ I f  on ly  a f r a c t i o n  o f  t h e  
d e f i c i t  w i l l  be financed by reduced c a p i t a l  formation and t h i s  amount i s  but  a 
p a r t  o f  t o t a l  c a p i t a l  formation i n  a given y e a r ,  then t h e  a c t u a l  impact o f  t h e  
Government's borrowing on the  s tandard  o f  l i v i n g  would no t  appear  t o  be t h a t  
g r e a t .  Conceivably i t  may no t  be n o t i c e a b l e  a t  a l l .  
The n e t  short-run e f f e c t  of  ou tput  composition e f f e c t s  on t h e  l e v e l  o f  
f r i c t i o n a l  unemployment i s  a l s o  d i f f i c u l t  t o  gauge. A s h i f t  o f  two percent  o f  
GNP away from housing, consumer du rab l e s ,  expor t s  and import competing indus-  
t r i e s  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t .  The e f f e c t  on aggrega te  supply ,  however, a l s o  depends on 
how e a s i l y  resources  can s h i f t  from these  s e c t o r s  t o  where they a r e  i n  demand. 
I n  a growing economy, t h e  demand f o r  l a b o r  and c a p i t a l  grows, s o  t h a t  a composi- 
t i o n a l  s h i f t  i n  demand from one s e c t o r  t o  another  can f r equen t ly  be  expected t o  
show up  a s  a r educ t ion  i n  t h e  r a t e  o f  growth o f  l a b o r  and investment  demand f o r  
a given i n d u s t r y  i n s t e a d  o f  a reduc t ion  i n  t h e  abso lu t e  l e v e l s  o f  t h e s e  i n p u t s .  
Since c a p i t a l  wears ou t  and workers r e t i r e ,  i t  i s  poss ib l e  f o r  a n  i n d u s t r y  t o  
absorb small  decreases  i n  demand without much d i s r u p t i o n  and reduce i t s  sha re  
of  ou tput  by a t t r i t i o n .  A l a r g e  s h i f t  i n  demand may n o t  be  accommodated s o  
371 That i s ,  t he  slowdown t h a t  occurred some time a f t e r  1965, See Denison, 
~ d w a a .  Accounting f o r  Slower Economic Growth, t he  U.S. i n  t he  1970s. Brook- 
i n g s ,  Washington, 1979 and Kendrick, John.  P roduc t iv i t y  Trends and t h e  Recent 
P roduc t iv i t y  Slowdown. I n  Contemporary Economic Problems, American E n t e r p r i s e  
I n s t i t u t e ,  Washington, 1979, pp. 17-69. 
38/ Denison, Edward. Accounting f o r  U.S. Economic Growth, 1927-1969. 
~ r o o k i n ~ s ,  Washington, 1974, and Jorgenson,  D .W. and Chr i s t ensen ,  L .R. U .S. 
Real Product and Real Fac tor  Inpu t ,  1929-1967. Review of  Income and Wealth, 
p -  16 (1970) pp- 19-50. 
e a s i l y  however. I n  t h a t  c a s e ,  a n  ad jus tment  i s  r e q u i r e d  where c u r r e n t l y  em- 
ployed workers must m i g r a t e  from d e c l i n i n g  t o  growing i n d u s t r i e s ;  one can expec t  
a  pe r iod  o f  unemployment between l a y o f f  o f  workers and t h e i r  r e h i r i n g .  The re -  
s u l t  i s  i n c r e a s e d  f r i c t i o n a l  unemployment d u r i n g  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n .  S t i l l ,  i f  t h i s  
ad jus tment  can be completed r e l a t i v e l y  q u i c k l y ,  t h e  shor t - run  i n c r e a s e  i n  f r f c -  
t i o n a l  unemployment could  be n e g l i g i b l e .  I f ,  however, t h e  ad jus tment  i s  long 
and c o s t l y ,  t h e  impact o f  such a  l a r g e  compos i t iona l  s h i f t  cou ld  make a  b i g  d i f -  
f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  ( temporary)  p o t e n t i a l  of  t h e  economy t o  produce. 
I n  any c a s e ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  i s  one o f  magnitudes and t o l e r a n c e s .  Presumably, 
t h e r e  a r e  some l e v e l s  o f  d e f i c i t  spending s o  low t h a t  t h e  problems t h e y  c r e a t e  
a r e  simply i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  Conversely ,  t h e r e  must a l s o  be some s i z e  o f  t h e  de- 
f i c i t  a t  which a d d i t i o n a l  borrowing could have s e r i o u s  consequences.  Whether 
t h e  d e f i c i t s  p r o j e c t e d  f o r  t h e  nex t  f i v e  y e a r s  exceed t h e  amount t h a t  marks 
t h e  t h r e s h o l d  o f  t h e  economy's a b i l i t y  t o  t o l e r a t e  f u r t h e r  borrowing wi thou t  
s u b s t a n t i a l  e f f i c i e n c y  c o s t s  i s  n o t  c l e a r .  Moreover, whatever t h o s e  c o s t s  o f  
borrowing a r e ,  t h e y  should be compared wi th  t h e  cos2 o f  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  
P r o j e c t e d  Government spending can  o n l y  be f inanced  i n  t h e  t h r e e  ways l i s t e d  
e a r l i e r :  t a x e s ,  borrowing, and money c r e a t i o n .  Taxes i n e v i t a b l y  cause  some 
d i s t o r t i o n  o f  i n c e n t i v e s  and economic i n e f f i c i e n c y .  Borrowing s h i f t s  t h e  com- 
p o s i t i o n  o f  demand, t end ing  t o  reduce t h e  r a t e  o f  economic growth i n  t h e  long- 
term and i n c r e a s i n g  f r i c t i o n a l  unemployment d u r i n g  t h e  shor t - run  ad jus tment  t o  
t h e  new a l l o c a t i o n  o f  o u t p u t .  Money c r e a t i o n  w i l l  cause  i n f l a t i o n  i f  used t o  
f i n a n c e  a  s h o r t f a l l  i n  revenues  f o r  a  l e n g t h  o f  t ime.  I d e a l l y  one would l i k e  
t o  a v o i d  a l l  t h e s e  consequences.  I n  r e a l i t y ,  t h e  b e s t  t h a t  can be expected i s  
t o  minimize t h e i r  e f f e c t s  by choosing t h e  l e a s t  harmful combination.  
It i s  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  such a  p a i n f u l  a n t i - i n f l a t i o n  p o l i c y  a s  r e c e n t l y  ex- 
pe r ienced  would have been under taken  i f  t h e r e  were n o t  a s t r o n g  d e s i r e  t o  avo id  
i n f l a t i o n .  Thus, i n f l a t i o n  appears  t o  be r u l e d  o u t  a s  a means o f  f inanc ing  Gov- 
ernment expendi tures .  The choice between t h e  remaining two o p t i o n s  depends on 
t h e  des i r ed  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  ou tput  and r a t e  o f  growth. 
I n  choosing the  t ax  i nc rease  approach, i t  need not  be t h e  ca se  t h a t  t h e  
supply s i d e  i n t e n t i o n s  of  t h e  o r i g i n a l  t a x  c u t s  be abandoned. There a r e  many 
d i s t o r t i o n s  i n  t he  t a x  code o t h e r  than j u s t  those  r e l a t e d  t o  work and l e i s u r e  
o r  saving and spending choices .  Anecdotal evidence sugges t s  t h a t  s u b s t a n t i a l  
uneconomic a c t i v i t y  occurs  both a s  a r e s u l t  o f  economic a g e n t s  t r y i n g  t o  s h e l t e r  
t h e i r  income from t a x a t i o n  and a s  a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  d e v i a t i o n  o f  a f t e r - t a x  c o s t s  
of some forms o f  investment r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e i r  t r u e  economic before- tax c o s t s .  
The e f f i c i e n c y  ga ins  t h a t  were achieved by t h e  t a x  c u t s  f o r  sav ing  and working 
a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  have been small  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  g a i n s  r e -  
l a t e d  t o  t h e s e  d i s t o r t i o n s .  For example, by reducing t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t a x  
r a t e s  imposed on d i f f e r e n t  a s s e t s ,  c a p i t a l  can be b e t t e r  a l l o c a t e d  and a reduc- 
t i o n  i n  t h e  resource  c o s t  o f  producing output  can be achieved;  by doing away 
with the  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t rea tment  accorded c a p i t a l  ga in s  r e l a t i v e  t o  o t h e r  income 
i t  can be pos s ib l e  t o  d i v e r t  investment from l e s s  product ive t o  more product ive 
uses;  ending the  tax-exempt s t a t u s  o f  f r i n g e  b e n e f i t  compensation can prevent  
the  d ive r s ion  o f  resources  i n t o  s e c t o r s  i n t o  which they  would n o t  go g iven  un- 
de r ly ing  economic c o s t s  and preferences .  Consequently,  g iven  t h e s e  a l t e r n a -  
t i v e s ,  i t  i s  a c t u a l l y  pos s ib l e  t o  reduce d i s t o r t i o n s  and tax-induced i n e f f i c i -  
ency by r a i s i n g  taxes  on tax-exempt and low-taxed a c t i v i t i e s .  Thus, i f  po l i cy  
makers s o  choose, t axes  can be i nc reased  and many d i s i n c e n t i v e s  eradicated--  
r a i s i n g  t a x  revenues and honoring supplys ide  i n t e n t i o n s  a t  t h e  same t ime.  
It i s  t h i s  f a c t  t h a t  may account f o r  much o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  i n t e r e s t  i n  t a x  
base broadening. An e f f o r t  t o  t r e a t  d i f f e r e n t  types  o f  income and expend i tu re s  
a l i k e  amounts i n  many ways t o  tax ing  d i f f e r e n t  a c t i v i t i e s  more uniformly,  re- 
ducing the  d i s t o r t i o n s  i n  t h e  economy t h a t  can r e s u l t  from t a x a t i o n  and t h a t  
tend t o  hold down the  supply o f  ou tpu t .  
V . CONCLUSION 
Government d e f i c i t s  have been regarded a s  pa r t  o f  expansionary po l i cy  f o r  
nea r ly  50 yea r s .  This  view has  been a t t acked  be fo re ,  bu t  h a s  been s u c c e s s f u l l y  
defended on both t h e o r e t i c a l  and empi r i ca l  grounds, becoming a c e n t r a l  f e a t u r e  
o f  mainstream macroeconomics. Recent ly ,  t h e  p ropos i t i on  has  been chal lenged 
aga in  by a v a r i e t y  o f  commentators who have argued t h a t  budget d e f i c i t s  through 
t h e i r  e f f e c t  on i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  a c t u a l l y  con t r ac t i ona ry .  There have been 
t h r e e  s e p a r a t e  and d i s t i n c t  arguments made i n  suppor t  o f  t h i s  a s s e r t i o n .  
F i r s t ,  some have i n s i s t e d  t h a t  c u r r e n t  d e f i c i t s  have e i t h e r  caused,  worsened 
o r  prolonged the  r ecen t  economic c o n t r a c t i o n  by r a i s i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and r e -  
t a r d i n g  i n t e r e s t  s e n s i t i v e  s e c t o r s  o f  t h e  economy. This  view which has  been 
almost uniformly r e j e c t e d  by economists f o r  many y e a r s ,  r e s u l t s  p a r t l y  from a 
confusion about t h e  r o l e  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ;  when i n t e r e s t  rates rise because 
of increased  Government borrowing i t  i s  because t h e  growing d e f i c i t s  r a i s e  ag- 
g rega t e  demand. Hence, i n t e r e s t  rate i n c r e a s e s  under t h e s e  circumstances a r e  
par t  of the  very process t h a t  r a i s e s  ou tput  and employment, no t  some kind o f  
independent o f f s e t  t o  t h e  s t imulus  provided by t h e  budget.  The view t h a t  
d e f i c i t s  can depress  concurrent  economic a c t i v i t y  a l s o  h inges  on a n  a n a l y s i s  
based on less than t h e  t o t a l  economy; i t  f r equen t ly  concen t r a t e s  on ly  on t h e  
s e c t o r s  adve r se ly  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and igno re s  t h e  s e c t o r s  t h a t  
a r e  helped by t h e  d e f i c i t  spending. 
Second, some argue t h a t  t h e  prospect  o f  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  ha s  made t h e  r e c e n t  
c o n t r a c t i o n  worse and has  r e t a rded  t h e  c u r r e n t  recovery.  This  i d e a  t h a t  projec-  
t i o n s  of  l a r g e  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  c r e a t e  expec t a t i ons  t h a t  s e rve  t o  c o n t r a c t  demand 
i s  a  r e l a t i v e l y  new view and i s  hard t o  e v a l u a t e  because i t s  proponents  have 
y e t  t o  s y s t e m a t i z e  i t  i n t o  any complete and c o n s i s t e n t  model. Following t h e  
a n a l y t i c a l  l e a d s  sugges ted  by t h o s e  who a s s e r t  t h i s  v iew,  a  t h e o r e t i c a l  inves -  
t i g a t i o n  o f  i t  shows t h a t  i n  some v e r s i o n s  i t  i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t - - r e q u i r i n g  t h a t  
i t s  proponents m a i n t a i n  t h a t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  t o o  low, f o r  example. I n  
a n o t h e r  v e r s i o n  i t  assumes s e l e c t i v e  i r r a t i o n a l  behav ior  on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  
p u b l i c  --a p o s s i b i l i t y ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  b u t  n o t  e a s i l y  accep ted  under  t h e  circum- 
s t a n c e s .  There i s  one v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  i n  which a  c o n t r a c t i o n a r y  
e f f e c t  can be d e r i v e d .  However, t h e r e  does  n o t  appear  t o  be ev idence  o f  f inan-  
c i a l  market a c t i v i t y  c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  t h i s  e x p e c t a t i o n s  s c e n a r i o ,  o r  o f  c o n d i t i o n s  
t h a t  would have made a  c o n t r a c t i o n a r y  outcome from d e f i c i t s  p o s s i b l e  d u r i n g  t h e  
r e c e n t  r e c e s s i o n .  
The t h i r d  argument about  d e f i c i t s  i s  n o t  t h a t  t h e y  have had any e f f e c t  i n  
s lowing o r  d e l a y i n g  t h e  recovery  now, b u t  t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  a b o r t  t h e  recovery  
l a t e r .  C a r e f u l  a n a l y s i s  shows t h a t  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  w i l l  
cause  a  f u t u r e  c o n t r a c t i o n  i s  probably n o t  what i t  seems t o  be.  Proponents  o f  
t h i s  view do n o t  seem t o  expec t  f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  t o  reduce a g g r e g a t e  demand l a t e r  
d u r i n g  recovery .  What t h e y  a r e  a p p a r e n t l y  r e f e r r i n g  t o  i s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  o f  l a r g e  
f u t u r e  d e f i c i t s  t o  reduce a g g r e g a t e  supp ly  by s h i f t i n g  t h e  composi t ion o f  o u t -  
put demanded. T h i s  could  occur  because  t h e  r e s o u r c e  s h i f t s  t h a t  would be r e -  
q u i r e d  by t h e  r e a l l o c a t i o n  o f  demand could  be l a r g e  enough t o  t e m p o r a r i l y  
i n c r e a s e  f r i c t i o n a l  unemployment o f  p roduc t ive  r e s o u r c e s  a s  l a b o r  and c a p i t a l  
make t h e i r  t r a n s i t  from d e c l i n i n g  t o  expanding s e c t o r s  o f  t h e  economy. Such 
demand s h i f t s  could  mean t h a t  t h e  recovery  w i l l  encounte r  a supp ly  c o n s t r a i n t  
be fore  t h e  economy reaches  what i s  more commonly accep ted  a s  f u l l  employment. 
The consensus  o f  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  1981-82 c o n t r a c t i o n  was p r i n c i -  
p a l l y  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a n t i - i n f l a t i o n a r y  monetary p o l i c y  t h a t  r e q u i r e d  a slowdown 
i n  monetary expansion and a  consequent r i s e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  The e f f e c t  of 
f i s c a l  po l icy  s i n c e  t he  implementation of  t he  t a x  c u t s  has  been expansionary.  
Thus, most economists contend t h a t  i t  has  been t h e  a n t i - i n f l a t i o n  e f f o r t s  o f  t h e  
Fed t h a t  p r imar i l y  in f luenced  the  depth o f  t h e  r eces s ion  and were r e spons ib l e  
f o r  many o f  t h e  p red i c t i ons  o f  a  s low recovery.  F i s c a l  p o l i c y ,  i f  anyth ing  pro- 
bably served t o  p a r t i a l l y  o f f s e t  t h e  e f f e c t s  of  c o n t r a c t i o n a r y  monetary po l icy .  
The a l l o c a t i o n a l  e f f e c t s  o f  l a r g e  and cont inu ing  d e f i c i t s  on t h e  economy 
seem t o  be t h e  primary source of  concern about t h e  s i z a b l e  budgetary s h o r t f a l l  
of  revenues below expendi tures .  E i t h e r  t h e  demand composition e f f e c t  on f r i c -  
t i o n a l  unemployment i s  regarded a s  a  s e r i o u s  c o s t  t o  bear  o r  t h e  r e t a r d a t i o n  
o f  investment r e s u l t i n g  from government borrowing i s  be l ieved  s i g n i f i c a n t  
enough t o  want t o  avoid.  Yet n e i t h e r  o f  t he se  e f f e c t s  may, i n  f a c t ,  be very  
g r e a t .  Due t o  a v a r i e t y  o f  reasons ,  t h e  crowding o u t  o f  bus ines s  investment 
may be r a t h e r  small  i n  t h e  face  o f  even l a r g e  d e f i c i t s .  The crowding o u t  
t h a t  does occur  may not  a f f e c t  economic growth by much e i t h e r .  The e f f e c t  on 
f r i c t i o n a l  unemployment i s  only temporary, and i t s  magnitude depends on t h e  
f l e x i b i l i t y  and responsiveness  o f  t h e  economy. C l e a r l y ,  however, t h e r e  i s  
some s i z e  o f  t h e  d e f i c i t  a t  which t h e s e  c o s t s  do become s i g n i f i c a n t .  It i s  
not r e a d i l y  apparent  whether t he  d e f i c i t s  p ro jec ted  over  t h e  next  f i v e  yea r s  
a r e  l a r g e  enough o r  too small  t o  cause s i g n i f i c a n t  supply  e f f e c t s .  
I f  i t  i s  be l ieved  t h a t  t h e s e  e f f e c t s  a r e  harmful enough t h a t  they  should 
be avoided,  t h e r e  remain but two methods o f  f inanc ing  government expendi ture :  
t axes  and money c r e a t i o n .  With i n f l a t i o n a r y  f inance  ru l ed  o u t  a s  a  source  o f  
paying f o r  government o u t l a y s ,  t he  choice comes down t o  one o f  reduced expendi- 
t u r e s  o r  increased  t axes .  I f  t axes  a r e  indeed increased  they need no t  r eve r se  
the  i n t e n t  of t he  1981 t ax  c u t s ,  however. By concen t r a t i ng  on t h e  o t h e r  a s p e c t s  
o f  tax-induced supply-side d i s t o r t i o n s ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  r a i s e  t a x e s  and s t i l l  
enhance efficiency by focusing efforts on base broadening and by addressing the 
unevenness of the tax burdens imposed on different economic activities, instead 
of the aggregate size of that burden. 
